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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a hypothetical situation in which a truly innocent, yet
seemingly guilty, debtor, whose unwitting complicity in the delivery of
testimony or documents in her bankruptcy case leads to her wrongful
conviction and imprisonment in a separate criminal matter due to
her ignorance of the existence of her constitutional right to the
privilege and her inability to assert it effectively.
She is among the increasing number of pro se debtors in

TARVIN(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/10/2014 3:44 PM

PLIGHT OF THE DEBTOR

49

1

bankruptcy. She does not know she is putting herself at risk to be
arrested and convicted because she, like most debtors in bankruptcy,
is unaware of much of the criminal law, even though criminal law
2
presumes that she has knowledge. Before examining more closely
the concepts of invocation, waiver, and the consequences associated
with each, consider the hypothetical plight of Sophie Debtor, a truly
3
innocent pro se debtor whose testimony would be incriminating.
4
Sophie Debtor lives in Hard Luck Town. She is a working mom
who is separated from her husband, Hank. She lost her job and filed
Chapter 7 pro se using forms on the court’s website. She will appear
before a trustee at a 341 meeting in thirty days to be examined under
5
oath about her finances, including transfers to others and cash
6
7
advances. She may be asked to turn over documents. Sophie is
1

Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other Debtor Relief,
LITIGATION
NEWS,
Dec.
29,
2011,
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories
/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html (last visited May 20, 2013) See infra Part
II.A and note 79 for the amounts by which pro se filings increased. While other
parties in bankruptcy such as creditors, trustees, and witnesses also enjoy the
privilege, the scope of this article is limited to the individual chapter 7 debtor.
Chapter 7 bankruptcies account for a majority of all bankruptcies, with over a million
cases filed in the calendar year ending Sept. 30, 2011. See U.S. Bankruptcy Courts,
Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the
12-Month
Period
Ending
Sept.
30,
2011,
http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2011/0911_f2.pdf (last
visited Aug. 16, 2013).
2
See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. State of Minn., 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910).
3
This paper does not assess the impact the interrogation of terrorism suspects.
The loss of their Miranda rights is covered by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (2012).
4
Song title used by the Blue-Eyed Devils, J.J. Muggler, and the Killer Dwarfs.
5
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“The trustee may avoid any
transfer . . . that was made or incurred within 2 years before the date of the filing of
the petition, if the debtor . . . received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or . . . and was insolvent on the date that such transfer was
made . . . .”).
6
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2012) (“[C]onsumer debts owed to a
single creditor and aggregating more than $650 for luxury goods . . . incurred by an
individual debtor on or within 90 days before the order for relief under this title are
presumed to be nondischargeable.”); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(II) (2012)
(“[C]ash advances aggregating more than $925 that are extensions of consumer
credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within
70 days before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be
nondischargeable . . . .”); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (holding that
the burden of proof in 523(a) cases is a preponderance of the evidence).
7
11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2012). But see In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 93 (1923) (stating
when a debtor loses control of documents, the privilege against self-incrimination
does not apply).
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legally entitled to claim her Fifth Amendment privilege against self8
incrimination. However, its existence was not disclosed in the forms
she prepared, and she will not be told about it. She imagines she
must do whatever the trustee says to get a discharge, including
appearing and testifying at the meeting of creditors.
The background that gives rise to the incriminating facts is that
Sophie’s husband, Hank, is authorized on Sophie’s credit card.
While Hank was having an affair with Corrie Delecti, he gave money
to Corrie from cash advances on Sophie’s credit card. Hank also
bought Corrie jewelry using Sophie’s credit card. The transactions
occurred before Sophie filed bankruptcy and without her knowledge
or consent. The bill arrives after Sophie files bankruptcy so the
transactions are not listed in the filing. When confronted, Hank
confesses to the affair and the credit card charges. He tells Sophie
that the money and jewelry are in Corrie’s apartment. Then, he
leaves.
Corrie Delecti is murdered and Sophie realizes that she was in
Corrie’s apartment building at the time of Corrie’s death. Sophie
had dropped by to see a friend who was not at home. Sophie’s friend
lives across the hall from Corrie’s apartment. Corrie was the
neighbor who told Sophie that her friend was out. An eyewitness saw
Sophie in the hall outside Corrie’s apartment near the time of the
murder, but neither the police nor Sophie know this. The witness
left that night and returned home to a rural area in another state
away from the media coverage attendant to the murder.
The Hard Luck Town forensics team finds no evidence to link
anyone specifically to the crime. Sophie has no way to establish her
innocence. She has a conviction six years ago for assaulting a woman
9
who flirted with Hank in a bar. She is truly innocent, but she is at
risk to be indicted, tried, and wrongfully convicted because of her
criminal record and her presence at the scene of the crime with the

8

11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2012) (“[S]ubject to any applicable privilege, the court may
order an attorney, accountant, or other person that holds recorded information . . .
to turn over or disclose such recorded information to the trustee.”) (emphasis
added); see McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1922) (stating that the privilege
against self-incrimination applies equally to criminal and civil bankruptcy
proceedings); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) (stating that the
privilege against self-incrimination is not limited to criminal cases).
9
Sophie’s prior conviction may or may not be admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 404
(“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.”).
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10

means, motive, and opportunity. Additionally, unless she learns of
11
the privilege, asserts it unambiguously, and insists on immunity, a
12
court is likely to deny her discharge in bankruptcy.
At the time of questioning, she is not a suspect in a capital crime,
but she is aware that her own testimony could lead to her arrest and
13
conviction. It is ironic that although Sophie will not be told of the
privilege, she will be informed of credit counseling requirements, the
available chapters of the bankruptcy code, bankruptcy crimes and
penalties, the availability of the papers she files for inspection by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the risk of dismissal if she fails to
14
file her financial information on time. If Sophie is not cooperative,
the trustee will object to discharge and may request immunity to
compel her testimony.
In sum, media reports reveal to Sophie that her responses will
place her at the scene of the horrific crime with means, motive,
opportunity, and no alibi. The circumstantial evidence is strong
enough to arrest, indict, and possibly convict her. Sophie knows that
a person unknown to her has murdered her husband’s mistress only
minutes after Sophie was in the hallway of the victim’s apartment
building to drop in on a friend who was not at home.
She does not know whether the police forensics team has been
10

For purposes of indictment, prosecutors are not required to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury and defense counsel may not be allowed to
present their own evidence. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52 (1992).
11
At the outset the Author wishes to clarify the term privilege. The use of the
term “privilege,” and all related terms, pertains to the privilege against selfincrimination unless otherwise indicated.
12
For purposes of this article, “invocation” and “proper assertion” will be used
interchangeably. A proper assertion is distinguishable from an ordinary assertion in
that a proper assertion must be unambiguous. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,
386–89 (2010); see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(12) (2012) (global objection to discharge
related to § 522(q)(1)(A) which applies when debtor has been convicted of a felony
which, under the circumstances, demonstrates that the filing of the case was an abuse
of the provisions of this title); 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1)(B)(iv) (2012) (“[T]he debtor
owes a debt arising from any criminal act . . . that caused serious physical injury or
death to another individual in the preceding 5 years.”); see also 18 U.S.C. §
3156(a)(3) (2012) (defining a felony as an offense punishable by a maximum term
of imprisonment of greater than one year).
13
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (stating that a person may assert the
privilege at trial despite her claim of innocence when she has “reasonable cause to
apprehend danger from her answers”).
14
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012) (requiring clerks to furnish all debtors with Official
Form B201A (notices to consumer debtors)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(1) (2012)
(requiring debt relief agents to provide Official Form B201A to “assisted persons”).
For a definition of “assisted persons,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(3) (2012) (defining an
assisted person as a debtor with less than $186,825 in non-exempt assets).
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able to find any evidence to further the investigation, or whether
there are any leads. She has no prior experience or training in
investigatory work; however, she is intelligent enough to know that
any attempts on her part to solve the case could implicate her
further. Sophie is truly innocent but at risk of being indicted, tried,
and wrongfully convicted while having her bankruptcy blocked
because she is unaware of her Fifth Amendment right to the privilege
against self-incrimination and how to properly assert it to protect
15
herself.
If she were aware of the privilege, she would invoke the
privilege, because there is evidence to link her to commission of the
crime. If she were represented and shared her fear of incrimination
with her attorney, in all likelihood she would be advised to invoke the
privilege because her responses will be incriminating. Because she is
pro se, she is far more likely to respond to the questioning, despite
knowledge that her responses will be incriminating.
If she were competently represented, her attorney would advise
her that her failure to unambiguously invoke her privilege would
result in the loss of the privilege. The plight of the debtor is that she
has few choices. She must testify under oath and incriminate herself
in a way that may lead to her arrest and wrongful conviction, or assert
her privilege. Her only other choice would be to perjure herself. If
she were represented, her attorney would advise her that, if she
testifies, she must speak truthfully even if her testimony is
16
incriminatory, and that perjury is not an option. Thus, she logically
would not speak and unknowingly waive her privilege because she
17
would know its importance.
Likewise, she would redact
15

See 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(12) (2012).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), 3.3, 4.1, 8.4; 18 U.S.C. § 1622
(1994) (2006). But see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.6 Comment (Discussion
Draft 1983):
[A] disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose.
If . . . in . . . a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a
manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other
persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or
other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent
practicable.
17
A debtor’s silence in this instance could be used against her in a subsequent
criminal trial. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2181–82 (2013). Sophie’s failure
to say, “But I didn’t kill her!” at the first meeting of the creditors is admissible unless
she invokes the privilege because she cannot rely on Miranda warnings that were
never given. See id. See also Michael J. Hunter, The Man on the Stairs Who Wasn’t There:
What Does A Defendant’s Pre-Arrest Silence Have to Do with Miranda, the Fifth Amendment,
16
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incriminating information from any required schedules.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
19
applies to debtors in bankruptcy. Despite the seeming protection of
20
the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may unwittingly waive her rights
21
and incriminate herself by failing to invoke the privilege. The pro
se debtor and the debtor with representation each need notice of the
constitutional protection so that they are aware of the consequences
of both invocation and waiver of the privilege. The possibility of a
debtor’s failure to properly invoke the privilege is made more
probable because there is no requirement that debtors be told about
22
the privilege prior to filing or interrogation.
A debtor may lose the privilege based on a waiver inferred from
23
her course of conduct or prior statements concerning a matter,
24
whether or not the waiver is knowing and intelligent. This may be
true even when counsel fails to advise the debtor to refuse to answer,
25
and the debtor is unaware at the time that the statements may be
26
incriminating. Once the debtor testifies, she may have waived the

or Due Process?, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 277, 308 (2005); Andrew J. M. Bentz, The Original
Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. L. REV. 897, 933
(2012) (arguing that an originalist view of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
substantive use of pre-Miranda silence).
18
Appendix A shows a mock transcript of the first meeting of creditors and
reveals the colloquy between Sophie and the trustee. Contrast Appendix A with
Appendix B where Sophie (or her attorney) has been made aware of the privilege
and asserts it unambiguously. See, e.g., In re Kanter, 117 F. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1902);
Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592, 599 (1913); Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d
889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 549 (1932); In re U.S. Hoffman Can
Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 629 (3d Cir. 1967).
19
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. 9017 (making the Federal
Rules of Evidence applicable in bankruptcy including FED. R. CIV. P. 43, 44 and 44.1);
FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that, except as required by the Constitution, federal statute,
or rules of the Court, the privilege of a person is governed by the principles of the
common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience; however, in civil litigation where State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege is determined in accordance with State law).
20
11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006).
21
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (citing United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931), overruled on other grounds Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1983)).
22
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976) (holding that a knowing
and intelligent waiver is not required in a noncustodial setting).
23
In re Litton, 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987).
24
In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 193 B.R. 152, 162 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing
Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)).
25
In re A&L Oil Co., 200 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996).
26
See In re Cotillion Invs., Inc., 343 B.R. 344, 351–52 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
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privilege for later proceedings as to all matters within the scope of
27
her testimony.
Without any requirement of notice, the exclusionary rule does
28
not apply in civil proceedings.
In short, the privilege must be
invoked through its unambiguous assertion in bankruptcy, or it is
29
lost. This poses special dangers and challenges for pro se debtors,
who comprise an increasing percentage of total consumer filings and
who are particularly at risk because of the complexity of the
30
proceedings and the exposure to criminal liability. The debtor who
is represented is also placed at risk to the extent she may not be
31
properly advised.
32
To secure the just determination of every case and protect the
debtor’s privilege, the Supreme Court, under its rulemaking
33
34
authority, should adopt a revised Official Form B201A for use in
consumer bankruptcy cases. The revised form would provide prefiling notice in writing of the privilege against self-incrimination. To
accomplish this, the Judicial Conference of the United States should
35
promulgate the proposed form pursuant to its rulemaking authority.
This simple change would serve to make the debtor aware of the
privilege prior to filing and the consequences of invocation and
waiver, so that the privilege would not be lost through ignorance,
inadvertence, or lack of competent counsel. This comports with the
27

See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 428 (1983).
See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984).
29
It is important in this context to distinguish between violations of the
“privilege” and violations of the “right” against self-incrimination. The evidentiary
privilege is violated when it is properly invoked, yet disclosure of incriminating
information is compelled in a setting in which no criminal penalties may attach. The
constitutional right against self-incrimination is violated when privileged information
is unprotected whether through non-disclosure or suppression in a setting that
subjects the person to the threat of imprisonment or other criminal penalties. See
21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1036 (1965).
30
Filing for Bankruptcy Without an Attorney, U.S. Administrative Office of the
Courts, BANKRUPTCY RESOURCES, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts
/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyResources/FilingBankruptcyWithoutAttorney.aspx
(last
visited Aug. 16, 2013).
31
See supra note 9; see also In re Cotillion Invs., Inc., 343 B.R. 344 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2006).
32
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 (2012).
33
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006); U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1
34
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2006); see Official Form B201A available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Current/B_
201A.pdf (providing notice of certain statutorily required information); see also infra
Part IV.A.1.
35
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 (2012).
28
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federal requirement of disclosure of the privilege in other civil
36
actions. Although the existing notices in Official Form B201A are
present because they are required by statutory authority to be given
37
to the debtor, the Court may still act under the inherent power of its
rulemaking authority to give notice of the privilege against self38
incrimination.
The debtor in bankruptcy should receive written notice of the
privilege against self-incrimination and acknowledge reading it prior
to filing, for only through the pre-filing delivery of notice will the
debtor’s right to the privilege be meaningful. This Article has four
parts. Part I analyzes the scope and application of the privilege and
distinguishes the privilege in bankruptcy from its counterpart in the
custodial setting. Part II examines the increased risk to the pro se
debtor and the value of the privilege to the factually innocent and the
factually guilty who are nonetheless presumptively innocent. Part III
explores the plight of the debtor under current law and explains the
risk of nondisclosure of the privilege. Finally, Part IV proposes a
change in the language of Official Form B201A to alleviate the

36

21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006), as implemented through 28 C.F.R. §§ 76.4, 76.6, &
76.9. The logical inference is that if Congress and the President through enabling
legislation and administrative policy can provide notice of a constitutional privilege
in a civil proceeding, the Court may do no less. For articles on the inherent
rulemaking authority of courts see James R. Wolf, Inherent Rulemaking Authority of an
Independent Judiciary, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507 (2002); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958); Roscoe Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in
New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34 (1952); see also United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d
929, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing that SEC Form 1662 provides notice that such
voluntary testimony will be provided to U.S. attorneys on a routine basis and may be
used in civil or criminal proceedings); IRS Form 8300, available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac
/Form-8300,-Report-of-Cash-Payments-Over-$10,000-Received-in-a-Trade-or-Business.
(“[W]e may also provide the records to appropriate state, local, and foreign criminal
law enforcement and regulatory personnel in the performance of their official
duties”). See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. 9017 (making the
Federal Rules of Evidence applicable in bankruptcy including FED. R. CIV. P. 43, 44
and 44.1); FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that, except as required by the Constitution,
federal statute, or rules of the Court, the privilege of a person is governed by the
principles of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience; however, in civil litigation where State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege is determined in accordance with State law).
37
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012).
38
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (“[G]uided by
considerations of justice,” and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts
may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or the Congress); see supra note 20.
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problems caused by nondisclosure.

II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY
A. The Privilege in American Jurisprudence
40

The historical origin of the privilege is obscure. Under English
case law, the privilege against self-incrimination was a common law
41
privilege. As English case law developed, the privilege applied only
when there appeared some possibility of incrimination as a result of
42
being compelled to answer.
The privilege did not apply to
43
bankruptcy proceedings.
The first United States Congress and three-fourths of the states
constitutionalized the privilege in the Fifth Amendment as a part of
44
the Bill of Rights in 1791.
The Court in United States v. Burr
recognized the privilege and acknowledged that the protection it
afforded permitted a person to refuse to give a response to a question
45
that could lead to incriminating evidence.
The privilege, when
properly invoked, protected the suspect, the criminal defendant, and
46
the civil litigant from forced compulsion of incriminating evidence.
39

See Official Form B201A, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Current/B_201A.pdf (providing notice of
certain statutorily required information); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 (2012); 11 U.S.C. §
342(b) (2012).
40
The historical development of the privilege at English common law is outside
the scope of this article. Some scholars link the origins of the English common law
privilege to the constitutional struggles in the latter half of the seventeenth century
that resulted in the abolition of the courts of Star Chamber and High Commission,
while others maintain that the true origins of the common law privilege are
attributable to the work of defense counsel during the rise of adversary criminal
procedure at the end of the eighteenth century. See Joseph H. Langbein, The
Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 1047 (1994).
41
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924) (citing Ex Parte Cossens, 1 Buck
531, 540 (1820)).
42
Regina v. Boyes, 1 Best & S. 311 (1861, Q.B.). For a discussion of the
historical development of the privilege in England, see LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR,
Criminal Procedure § 2.10(c) (3d ed. 2007).
43
Re Smith, 2 Deac. & Chit. 230 (1833); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41
(1924) (citing Ex Parte Cossens, 1 Buck 531, 540 (1820)).
44
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45
25 F.Cas. 38, 41 (C.C.D. Va.1807), (holding that the reach of the Fifth
Amendment was so broad as to make the privilege applicable when there was a mere
possibility of a criminal charge being made).
46
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562–63 (1892) (holding that the
privilege protects a person called to testify before a grand jury, even though that
person is not the accused, since grand jury is part of a “criminal case”), overruled in
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It also protected persons in criminal and civil proceedings by
requiring a grant of immunity as a predicate for the surrender of the
47
privilege. Although some states had bankruptcy laws, Congress did
48
49
not exercise its power to enact a permanent bankruptcy system
50
until 1898.
The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, or “the Act”, required the
51
debtor to testify but provided for a limited form of immunity,
preventing the use of incriminating testimony, except in a hearing on
52
objections to discharge. The immunity did not protect documents
53
54
that may have been produced, perjury and false oaths, or the fruits
55
of the debtor’s testimony. Because the immunity provided was not
56
coextensive with the privilege granted by Counselman v. Hitchcock,
the Court held that a debtor could not be forced to give
57
incriminating testimony.
B. The Privilege in the Modern Era
By the early twentieth century, American case law had developed
to hold that the privilege against self-incrimination applied in
58
bankruptcy proceedings.
Eventually, the Act was amended to
part Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The reasoning, or dicta, in
Counselman extended the privilege to other judicial proceedings even if not part of a
“criminal case.”
47
Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562–63.
48
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
49
Earlier Acts lasted only briefly. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat.
19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5
Stat. 440, repealed by Act of March. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; Bankruptcy Act of 1867,
ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, amended by Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178, repealed by
Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 170, 20 Stat. 99.
50
The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended,
sometimes called the Nelson Act, repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598.
51
Id. at 11 U.S.C. § 7a(10) (repealed 1878).
52
Ensign v. Com. of Pa., 227 U.S. 592, 599 (1913).
53
In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 93–94 (1923).
54
Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636, 646 (8th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 205 U.S.
543 (1907).
55
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 3-344 (16th ed. 2012).
56
See 142 U.S. 547, 585–86 (1892) (reasoning that no statute that leaves the party
or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the incriminating question can
supplant the privilege and holding that to be valid, a statute must afford absolute
immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates).
57
In re Nachman, 114 F. 995, 997 (D.S.C. 1902).
58
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); In re Rosser, 96 F. 305, 308 (E.D.
Mo. 1899); see also Craig Peyton Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth of Consequences:
The Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 501 (1997).
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provide that immunity not only applied to testimony, but to evidence
59
“directly or indirectly derived from such testimony . . . .” The Court
developed a standard requiring that the privilege protect an
individual when she reasonably believes a disclosure could be used in
60
a criminal prosecution. The application and scope of the privilege
in the various aspects of the bankruptcy process will be more closely
61
examined in Part III.
The debtor in bankruptcy, like persons in other civil
proceedings, does not enjoy the same protections afforded by the
62
privilege to those in criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, if the
debtor is interrogated about matters that could prove incriminating,
63
she may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and insist on
64
immunity before answering.
C. The Privilege in Varying Contexts
The differences between the privilege in the custodial or
criminal setting and the bankruptcy setting create special challenges
for debtors, clearly shown by examining the procedural safeguards
65
afforded a person in a custodial or criminal setting. The Court in
the custodial setting seeks to ensure that any waiver of the privilege
be knowing and intelligent by requiring that Miranda rights be
66
given.
If the Miranda rights are not given, a presumption of
59

Pub. L. No. 91-452, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2012)
(codifying § 207 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970); see United States v.
Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding conviction despite Defendant’s
argument that § 7a(10) prior to the amendment was unconstitutional, and holding
that Congress had power to grant restricted immunity to witnesses who fail to invoke
the privilege).
60
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972).
61
See infra Part III.
62
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (stating that an
individual under custodial interrogation is entitled to warning (notice) of her right
to remain silent or end questioning and her right to an attorney); see also Laurent
Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535 (2012).
63
See supra note 12.
64
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
65
The use of the terms “custodial” and “criminal” will be used interchangeably
for purposes of the Article.
66
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966) (stating that interrogation is custodial if it
occurs while the individual is “in custody at the [police] station or otherwise deprived of
his freedoms of action in any significant way”) (emphasis added). If the interrogation is
custodial:
[h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
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compulsion arises that may lead to the suppression of any evidence
67
obtained under the exclusionary rule.
The Court has held that a person in the criminal context, who is
subject to custodial interrogation, must be told of her rights against
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment before she can waive
68
those rights.
The burden is on the state to establish the
69
Although the debtor is required to
voluntariness of the waiver.
appear at various times throughout the bankruptcy process, and is
70
subject to questioning, she is not entitled to Miranda warnings at any
71
time during the proceedings. For this reason, the debtor may be
unaware when she files her bankruptcy petition and schedules, or
when she testifies at any point in the bankruptcy proceedings, that
she is potentially opening herself up to criminal liability through
waiver of the privilege.

he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
67
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460–65.
68
See id. at 444.
69
Id. Waiver of the privilege appears in a variety of contexts requiring the
court’s judgment. Compare Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) (“A criminal
defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce
any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his
statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding.”), with
Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1417 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment was still relevant as to a psychiatrist called by the defense but it did not
warrant habeas relief).
70
11 U.S.C. § 341(d) (2006) (“[T]he trustee shall orally examine the
debtor . . . .”) (emphasis added).
71
See United States v. Jackson, 836 F.2d 324, 327 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
debtor who was “convicted of giving false oaths at bankruptcy proceedings and
concealing creditor’s collateral” was not entitled to Miranda warnings during the
bankruptcy proceedings). Furthermore, other courts have held that a person is not
“in custody” for Miranda purposes merely because of his compelled appearance at a
judicial proceeding to give testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez, 228 F.3d
19, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) (hearing on motion to dismiss criminal charges of another
person); United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 410 (1st Cir. 1998) (criminal trial of
another); United States v. Kilgroe, 959 F.2d 802, 804–05 (9th Cir. 1992) (criminal
trial of another); United States v. Vecchiarello, 569 F.2d 656, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(depositions); Unites States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(interrogation by the House Judiciary Committee); United States v. Pommerening,
500 F.2d 92, 99–100 (10th Cir. 1974) (grand jury witnesses); State v. Cathey, 741 P.2d
738, 743 (Kan. 1987) (inquisition hearing) overruled on other grounds by State v.
Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 78 (Kan. 2006); State v. Tonzola, 621 A.2d 243, 247 (Vt.
1993) (“inquest” procedure to investigate crime).
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D. The Privilege in Bankruptcy Proceedings
In the early years of the republic, the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination was held to exist whenever there was the
72
mere possibility of incrimination.
The literal wording of the
constitutional provision states: “No person . . . shall be compelled in
73
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . .”
Prior to
Miranda, there was no obligation to advise a person in either the
criminal or civil setting; the privilege, once invoked, was equally
74
protective in both.
However, today the invoked privilege against self-incrimination
75
in bankruptcy is not the equal of its custodial counterpart. With the
passage of time, the privilege in the criminal setting has evolved into
76
a more robust right, requiring a “knowing and intelligent” waiver.
Miranda strengthened the presumption of compulsion on failure to
77
warn and the application of the exclusionary rule. In contrast, its
civil counterpart has atrophied to the point that a knowing and
intelligent waiver is not required, but rather, may be inferred from
78
prior unwarned conduct or testimony.
E. Types of Immunity
Immunity is a term of art in the law, with many nuanced
79
meanings dependent on context. The types of immunity that are
relevant in this context are transactional immunity, use immunity,
and derivative use immunity. Immunity acts like a dam, holding back
compelled testimonial information from use in a criminal

72

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 41 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
74
The pre-Miranda privilege was “equally protective” in the civil and criminal
settings in that (1) notice was not required prior to interrogation, (2) transactional
immunity was required in either context to compel testimony, and (3) no adverse
inference could be drawn from silence. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
452–53 (1972). The privilege would be eroded further in 1976 when Baxter v.
Palmiagiano allowed an adverse inference to be drawn from silence in civil cases. See
425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
75
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 567 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
77
See id. at 462.
78
In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 193 B.R. 152, 162 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing
Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)); In re Litton, 74 B.R. 557, 560
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987).
79
Congressional immunity, sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity, and
judicial immunity are beyond the scope of this Article. Though each could touch the
realm of bankruptcy practice, none lie at the heart of the Author’s thesis.
73
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prosecution while allowing the regulated release of that same privileged
information in other settings. Historically, immunity is the price the
sovereign must pay for forfeiture of the privilege.
1. Transactional Immunity
As the term implies, transactional immunity is a grant of
immunity that shields the witness from any exposure to criminal
80
liability related to a particular transaction.
In other words, the
witness, having been given transactional immunity and compelled to
testify, cannot thereafter be charged, prosecuted, convicted, or
punished for any related matters despite the fact that the witness’s
guilt could be established without use of the witness’s testimony or
the fruits of that testimony. Thus, the price paid for the forfeiture of
the privilege is the sovereign’s guarantee that the witness is protected
from exposure to criminal liability regarding the particular
transaction. For that reason, the witness’s constitutional right to the
privilege is not violated, because the immunity removes the potential
criminality and renders testimony that would otherwise be
81
incriminating innocuous in a criminal context.
2. Use Immunity
Use immunity is more limited than transactional immunity in
that the witness is protected only from the “use” of the witness’
testimony in any criminal proceeding against the witness. In other
words, if the state has sufficient evidence apart from the testimony
compelled of the witness following the grant of immunity, the witness
may be tried with that evidence. The burden is on the state to
establish that the evidence adduced does not use the quarantined
82
To the extent that use immunity rather than
testimony.
transactional immunity will suffice as the state’s “payment” to
eliminate the debtor’s privilege, the value of the privilege is reduced
because of the degree to which protection from criminal prosecution
83
is lost.
80

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892), overruled by Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
81
Id.
82
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964),
abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 542 U.S. 666 (2007).
83
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 466–67 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“When we allow the
prosecution to offer only ‘use’ immunity we allow it to grant far less than it has taken
away. For while the precise testimony that is compelled may not be used, leads from
that testimony may be pursued and used to convict the witness.”).
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3. Derivative Use Immunity
Closely related to use immunity is derivative use immunity.
Derivative use immunity denies the state the use of evidence that is
derived from the witness’ testimony. Thus, not only is the actual
testimony immune, but also the “fruits” of the immunized testimony
are forbidden fruits that may not be used in a criminal proceeding
84
against the witness.
F. Two Privileges from One Right
Over time, the Supreme Court has altered the type of immunity
necessary to compel testimony in the face of a proper assertion of the
privilege. As examined below in Part III.E, the Court, over the course
of history, has moved from a rule mandating transactional immunity
in exchange for “immunized testimony” to a rule permitting the
compulsion of privileged testimony through a grant of use immunity
85
and derivative use immunity.
The implications of the Court’s
decisions affect debtors, debtors’ counsel, and the courts in
dramatically different ways.
Because transactional immunity is no longer required to compel
testimony over an assertion of the privilege, debtors remain at risk of
prosecution after the compulsion of testimony. Instead, the Court
86
has held that use and derivative use immunity is sufficient. As a
result, in the words of Justice Brennan, “use immunity literally misses
half the point of the privilege, for it permits the compulsion without
87
removing the criminality.”
In short, the modern day privilege
against self-incrimination in the bankruptcy setting is an anemic
distant cousin of its former self.
Clearly, two distinct privileges have emerged from one
84

Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79.
While the United States Supreme Court has held that use and derivative use
immunity are sufficient, some state courts still require transactional immunity. See,
e.g., Pratt v. Kirkpatrick, 718 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1986); Steinberger v. District Court, In
and For Tenth Judicial Dist., 596 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1979); State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d
915 (Haw. 1980); People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald, 363 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. 1977); In re
Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 516 A.2d 976 (Md. 1986); Matter of Pressman, 658
N.E.2d 156 (Mass. 1995); People v. McIntire, 599 N.W.2d 102 (Mich. 1999); State v.
Charest, 336 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1983); Kelly v. Grand Jury of Lewis and Clark Cnty.,
552 P.2d 1399 (Mont. 1976); People v. Chin, 490 N.E.2d 505 (1986); State ex rel.
Koren v. Grogan, 629 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 1994); State v. Bertoldi, 495 A.2d 247 (R.I.
1985); State v. Runions, 665 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1983); State v. Cottrill, 511 S.E.2d 488
(W. Va. 1998).
86
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
87
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 567 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85
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fundamental constitutional right. In the criminal setting, notice of
the privilege must be given; waiver must be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent; and no adverse inference may be drawn from an
invocation of the privilege. In the civil setting, notice need not be
given; waiver need not be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; and an
adverse inference may be drawn. As important as these differences
are to judges, attorneys, and academics, it has the greatest impact on
the civil litigant to whom no explanation is required. This is
particularly true of the debtor in chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings
for at least three reasons: (1) the debtor’s inability to voluntarily
88
dismiss the proceedings; (2) the debtor’s forfeiture of ownership of
books, records, and documents to the trustee as custodian of the
89
estate; and (3) the inference of waiver of the privilege that arises
90
from the filing of statements and schedules with the petition.
The pro se debtor and the debtor with representation each need
notice of the privilege, its scope, and its limitations no less than those
91
who are subject to custodial interrogation.
The constitutional
protection intended for the benefit of all citizens is at risk when the
existence of the privilege remains undisclosed. Without appropriate
disclosures to the debtor regarding proper invocation, the possibility
of inferred waiver of the privilege, and the consequences that flow
from both invocation and waiver, the privilege serves no purpose.

88

In re Bartee, 317 B.R. 362, 366 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (chapter 7 suit may only
be dismissed for cause). Chapter 11 debtors must also establish cause for a dismissal
of their suit. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2012); In re Helmers, 361 B.R. 190 (Bankr. D. Kan.
2007). Chapter 12 and 13 debtors are given an absolute right to dismissal by statute,
but the Eighth Circuit has held that a trustee may convert the case to chapter 7
(thereby requiring a show of cause) even after the debtor has moved for dismissal.
11 U.S.C. § 1208(a) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (2012); In re Graven, 936 F.2d 378,
387 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Molitor, 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1996).
89
See In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 94 (1923) (holding that where the debtor is
required to deliver books and papers in the bankruptcy proceedings, she is not
privileged under the Fifth Amendment).
90
See Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 549 (1932).
91
The many scenarios under which the need for the privilege may arise are so
varied that the scope of this Article cannot extend to them all. See United States v.
Greer, 631 F.3d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1841 (2011) (holding
that a tattoo is “testimonial” such that the privilege against self-incrimination could
apply).
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIVILEGE
A. The Rise of the Pro Se Debtor in Bankruptcy
Over the last five years, the rate of pro se bankruptcy filings grew
much faster than the rate of growth of overall bankruptcy filings,
92
particularly in the western part of the United States. Non-pro se
bankruptcy petitions rose 98 percent over the last five years, while pro
93
se filings grew 187 percent over the same time period.
Pro se
chapter 7 (liquidation) filings jumped 208 percent, and pro se
94
chapter 13 (reorganization) filings were up 189 percent. Between
2007 and 2011, pro se chapter 7 filings increased from 6 percent to 8
percent and pro se chapter 13 filings increased from 6 percent to 10
95
percent.
To give these percentages real meaning, it is worthwhile to
convert them to raw numbers. For the period ending in June 2011,
96
there were just over one million consumer chapter 7 bankruptcies.
The 8 percent figure represents nearly 84,000 pro se chapter 7
97
Ten percent of all chapter 13 filings
debtors in one year.
98
constituted nearly 43,000 during that same time period. Together,
the total number of filings by pro se debtors has swollen to over
99
Notably, this increase in pro se filings as a
125,000 per year.
percentage of all filings occurred during a period when the total
100
number of annual bankruptcy filings doubled.
The effect of this dramatic increase is not spread evenly around
101
the country. There appears to be some correlation between pro se
102
filings and areas with reduced family income. For example, pro se
92

The Third Branch, By the Numbers—Pro Se Filers in the Bankruptcy Courts,
OFFICE
OF
THE
U.S.
COURTS
(2011),
ADMINISTRATIVE
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-10-01
/By_the_Numbers—Pro_Se_Filers_in_the_Bankruptcy_Courts.aspx.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
The total number was 1,047,131. Id.
97
Id.
98
The Third Branch supra note 92.
99
Id.
100
The total number of bankruptcy filings for the period ending June 2007 was
751,056, while the total for the period ending June 2011 was 1,529,560. The Third
Branch, supra note 92.
101
Id. (indicating the percent of bankruptcy cases filed pro se on a map).
102
Ronald Brownstein & Scott Bland, The Geography of Pain, THE NAT’L J.
(updated Sept.30, 2011), available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine
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filings in the Central District of California represented 27.1 percent
103
of all filings, while in the Eastern District of California pro se filings
104
were 16.5 percent of all filings. In Arizona, pro se filings comprised
105
20.8 percent of all filings.
B. Protecting the Innocent
The factually guilty individual, who must remain presumptively
innocent, and the factually innocent person, who is only seemingly
106
guilty, must both be protected. The rights of each must be guarded
by the attorney-client privilege from the public disclosure of her
107
admissions to counsel.
Regardless of whether she is guilty or
innocent, her privilege against self-incrimination must be preserved
108
through proper invocation, if necessary. She must not be subjected
to interrogation tactics that rob her of her right to remain silent and
109
her right to stop the questioning. She must remain innocent until
she decides to waive her rights and enter a voluntary plea, or demand
a trial at which her peers will weigh whether the state has proven each
110
element of any charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
/census-sheds-new-light-on-toll-of-great-recession-20110929 (last visited Aug. 16,
2013). Twenty states saw their median family incomes plummet at least a dizzying
five percent over those two years (2008–2010). The largest losses were clustered in
the twin poles of Sun Belt and Rust Belt states: on the one hand, Arizona, Georgia,
Florida, Nevada, Alabama, North Carolina, California, and South Carolina; on the
other, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio. Id. A more diverse list of seventeen other states
lost between three and five percent of median family income. Id.
103
There were 39,478 pro se filings in the Central District of California out of a
total of 145,741 consumer filings. Id.
104
There were 8,877 pro se filings compared to 53,888 total consumer filings in
the Eastern District of California. The Third Branch, supra note 92 (showing
percentage grouping of bankruptcy cases filed pro se on a map).
105
In Arizona there were 8,625 pro se filings among the 41,377 total consumer
filings. Id.
106
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is
a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law.”).
107
FED. R. EVID. 501; see 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 386–
445 (6th ed. 2006).
108
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (citing Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 459 (1994)) (holding that a suspect’s Miranda right to remain silent, stop
questioning, or request counsel must be invoked “unambiguously”).
109
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“[T]he prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”).
110
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Protection of the rights of the factually guilty in a criminal
situation is often the easier problem for counsel because the guilty
often realize they need to exercise every legal right available to
111
them. Thus, the desire for, and value of, the evidentiary privilege is
clear and urgent. The guilty client may seek counsel before there is a
real threat of arrest or prosecution. As the book of Proverbs says:
“The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the righteous are bold
112
as a lion.”
Fear is a powerful motivator, and those who believe
themselves to be in violation of the law are more likely to seek to
protect themselves, whether through concealment, flight, or legal
counsel. On the other hand, it is equally true that the righteous or
innocent are bold. They are apt to be far less cautious because they
have no reason to suspect they are being pursued, making them all
the more vulnerable.
And so, though it may seem ironic, the truly innocent person is
113
on the continuum of those whose rights need protecting.
This is
true, not because of what she has done, but because of what someone
else may have done. She may fall prey to the wrongdoer who would
use her as a scapegoat. Law enforcement and vigilantes may target
her as a suspect when the true perpetrator is not self-evident. She
may be victimized by the ineptitude of investigators who overlook
some clues and misdiagnose others. And, to be sure, she may naively
incriminate herself because of her misplaced confidence in our
system of justice and her inability to think like a criminal, a
policeman, a prosecutor, a judge, or a juror. It is precisely because
the innocent does not feel guilty that she is most vulnerable. Unlike
her guilty counterpart, she feels no need to be guarded in her speech
or conduct, nor does she sense a need for the protection afforded by
counsel. In short, the system ostensibly designed for the protection
of the innocent offers many opportunities for the forfeiture of her
114
rights and liberties.
111

This is true when the criminal conduct remains undiscovered and at all points
in the criminal process.
112
Proverbs 28:1 (King James).
113
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (stating that a person may assert
privilege at trial of the accused despite her claim of innocence when she has
“reasonable cause to apprehend danger from an answer”).
114
In 2011 in United States District Courts, dismissals and acquittals totaled 8,197
in criminal proceedings. Judicial Business of the United States Courts, ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf 230 (last visited
Aug. 16, 2013). In 2010 in federal criminal courts, 7,782 cases were dismissed and
415 defendants were acquitted. Dismissals and acquittals (“outcome for a defendant
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When an innocent person does assert her privilege, another
danger is the cultural belief that those who assert the privilege must
115
in fact be guilty. From a modern day perspective, our society may
116
decry the injustices that gave rise to the privilege.
Yet, in a
collective denial of our own cultural hypocrisy, there is often a
perception of guilt and an expectation that the accused should be
compelled to speak and establish her innocence, or by her silence
117
admit the truthfulness of the allegations, however damning.
in a case”) for the five-year period beginning in 2005 totaled 41,709. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, Federal Criminal Case Processing
Statistics,
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc
/var.cfm?ttype=one_variable&agency=AOUSC&db_type=CrimCtCases&saf=OUT
(last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (Note: to access the information click the “year” tab, then
the “outcome” tab to add each year for the total). One explanation for the number
of dismissals and acquittals is that, while the suspect originally appeared guilty,
further investigation revealed her innocence. It is logical to assume that there is a
direct relationship between the loss of the privilege and the increased likelihood of
arrest, prosecution, and conviction because, by definition, the suspect is compelled
to provide incriminating evidence against herself. This possibility of innocence is a
key reason that the debtor must be informed of her privilege against selfincrimination. This need for disclosure is manifest in the number of exonerations.
Infra note 129. Therefore, if the justice system will inevitably convict the innocent, it
is logical that the same system would establish innocence even when someone is
factually guilty.
115
Cf. Politifact Florida, Does Rick Scott Invoking the Fifth Amendment Imply Guilt?,
available at http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2010/oct/12
/florida-democratic-party/does-rick-scott-invoking-fifth-amendment-imply-gui/ (last
visited Aug. 16, 2013) (questioning whether Florida governor Rick Scott had implied
his own guilt by claiming the Fifth Amendment, as he was so accused by a television
ad).
116
LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.10(c) (3d ed.). The
Court in Miranda noted that the privilege originated in the trial of John Lilburn who
was made to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would have bound him
to answer to all questions posed to him on any subject. He resisted the oath and
declaimed the proceedings, because he believed that “no man’s conscience ought to
be racked by oaths imposed, to answer to questions concerning himself in matters
criminal.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458–59 (1966). On account of the
Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber. Id. The
Court also illustrated the fact that custodial interrogation (even without brutality)
takes a heavy toll on individuals in the following examples:
In Townsend v. Sain, the defendant was a 19-year-old heroin addict,
described as a ‘near mental defective.’ The defendant in Lynumn v.
Illinois was a woman who confessed to the arresting officer after being
importuned to ‘cooperate’ in order to prevent her children from being
taken by relief authorities. This Court, as in those cases, reversed the
conviction of a defendant in Haynes v. Washington, whose persistent
request during his interrogation was to phone his wife or attorney.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455–56 (citations omitted).
117
Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1328
(2009) (“Courts should adjust the mix by rewarding defendants more for testifying
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Society’s expectation that the innocent person who is accused should
speak, arises from the perception that innocence is susceptible to
proof. This view prevailed in the courts prior to the adoption of the
privilege and is premised on the idea that only the guilty would
118
remain silent in the face of the threat of criminal punishment. This
perpetuates the “trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt
119
that the privilege was designed to avoid. The accused must testify,
lie, or face the possibility of contempt or conviction for her silence.
C. The Negative Proof Burden
In a civilized society, most individuals more readily imagine
120
being the victim of crime than the perpetrator.
The thought of
establishing legal innocence may not seem frightening. Instead, a
121
person may presume that our judicial system will protect her, as the
law goes to great lengths to avoid asking a litigant to prove a negative
122
proposition precisely because of the admitted difficulty. Statutes of
limitation and statutes of fraud are examples of society’s desire to
avoid injustice to defendants in civil and criminal proceedings due to
123
concerns about insufficiency of evidence.
The law and society acknowledge that proving a negative
and punishing them more for declining to testify.”).
118
LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.10(c) (3d ed.).
119
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990) (“At its core, the privilege
reflects our fierce ‘unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”‘ (quoting Doe v. United States,
487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988))).
120
In this context, a civilized society is one governed by the rule of law and in
which most people are law-abiding.
121
In a recent study, seventy-two participants (first year Psychology students) were
deemed “guilty or innocent of a mock theft [and] were apprehended for
investigation. Motivated to avoid prosecution and trial, they were confronted by a
neutral, sympathetic, or hostile male ‘detective’ who sought a waiver of their Miranda
rights.” Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights:
The Power of Innocence, 28 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 211 (2004). “[P]articipants who
were truly innocent were significantly more likely to sign a waiver than those who
were guilty.” Id. The study concluded that most subjects waived their rights even in a
hostile detective condition where the risk of interrogation was apparent based on a
naive belief in the power of their innocence to set them free. Id. at 212–13.
122
The burden of proof is on the civil litigant seeking redress to adduce the
necessary evidence and affirmatively prove the elements of the cause of action or the
elements of the crime in a criminal action. Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th
Cir. 1994); Rockwell v. Comm’r, 512 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Orth,
530 N.E.2d 210, 215 (Ill. 1988); Lublin v. Cent. Islip Psychiatric Ctr., 372 N.E.2d 307,
310 (N.Y. 1977); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
123
51 AM. JUR. 2D, Limitation of Actions § 9 (2007); 73 AM. JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds
§ 425 (2007).
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proposition, such as true innocence, may require much more
124
evidence than proving an affirmative proposition, such as guilt.
The danger is the possibility that the accused is truly innocent,
coupled with the magnitude of the harm arising from a wrongful
125
conviction. The privilege protects the truly innocent person whose
126
testimony would make her appear guilty.
D. The Factually Guilty
The value of the privilege is no less important to the debtor who
is factually guilty than it is to the debtor who is only seemingly guilty.
The privilege protects the factually guilty person by preserving the
127
presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial.
The
presumption of innocence is critical to providing fundamental
fairness to the accused in a criminal setting. It is diminished to the
extent that the accused is compelled to testify through the
inadvertent loss of the privilege. Because guilt is a legal conclusion
that must await the outcome of judicial proceedings, preservation of
the privilege is essential to protect the factually guilty. The American
128
legal system is founded on an accusatorial basis, not inquisitorial.
E. The Wrongfully Convicted
The risk of wrongful arrest, prosecution, and conviction is real.
With modern day forensics, the number of innocent people who have
been wrongfully convicted is increasingly evident. As of August 19,
2013, the Innocence Project has exonerated 311 persons through

124

See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 218.
Consider Eddie Joe Lloyd, a mentally handicapped man who falsely confessed
to the rape and murder of a young woman after police led him to believe that he
would smoke out the real killer. See Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, 250 Exonerated—
Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, Innocence Project Report, available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject_250.pdf (last visited Aug.
16, 2013). See discussion supra at Part II.E. See also JUSTIN BROOKS, WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS 4 (1st ed. 2011).
126
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (stating that a person may assert
privilege at trial of the accused despite her claim of innocence when she has
“reasonable cause to apprehend danger from an answer”).
127
United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Silence is the
right of the innocent as well as of the guilty.”); De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d
140, 151 (5th Cir. 1962) (“To make the privilege against self-incrimination effective
and to preserve the presumption of innocence, almost all of the states adopted laws
forbidding comment on a defendant’s neglect or refusal to testify and decreeing that
no inference should be drawn from his silence.”).
128
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
125
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129

DNA testing in the United States. The protection of the innocent is
inextricably linked to the presumption of innocence and the
privilege against self-incrimination.
False confessions and
incriminating statements lead to wrongful conviction in
130
approximately 27 percent of cases. Nearly 10 percent of exonerees
131
pled guilty to crimes they did not commit.
Wrongful convictions are more likely to occur when an adverse
inference is drawn from exercise of the privilege, causing an innocent
person to appear guilty. Although jurors may be instructed not to
consider a defendant’s refusal to testify, in reality, it is difficult for a
jury instruction to override the temptation to believe that the
132
defendant has something to hide.
IV. THE PLIGHT OF THE DEBTOR IN RETAINING THE PRIVILEGE
The privilege may be lost at any time. To the extent that the
debtor is not aware that the privilege may be waived, or how it may be
waived, the privilege is at risk. Thus, even a debtor that is aware of
the privilege may inadvertently waive it. When facing criminal
charges, retaining the privilege is as critical as claiming it.
A. Invocation of the Privilege
During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, a debtor may
be exposed to various instances in which she may be asked to provide
incriminating evidence and need to invoke the privilege. The Code
requires the debtor to attend a meeting of creditors and be orally
133
examined under oath by a trustee.
The debtor must answer
129

THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Aug.
19, 2013). The Innocence Project details each one of the first 250 DNA exoneration
cases and includes statistics on common causes of the wrongful convictions. See Barry
Scheck & Peter Neufeld, 250 Exonerated—Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, Innocence
Project Report, 1, 51 (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs
/InnocenceProject_250.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
130
Id. at 32–33.
131
Id.
132
In 1980, one study concluded that defendants who appeared to withhold
evidence were judged more harshly, indicating that something (we don’t know what)
goes on in the mind of the jury. E. GIL CLARY & DAVID R. SHAFFER, Effects of Evidence
Withholding and a Defendant’s Prior Record on Juridic Decisions, 112 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 237
(1980). Another study concluded, however, that pleading the fifth did not have as
great an effect on the strength of the conviction meted out by mock jurors as did
pleading guilty. SHELLEY M. FISCHER & LAWRENCE A. FEHR, The Effect Of Defendant’s
Plea On Mock Juror Decisions, 125 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 531–33 (1985).
133
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006) (“Immunity for persons required to submit to
examination, to testify, or to provide information in a case under this title may be
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questions of creditors at that meeting. The debtor may also be
134
Each of these proceedings is
deposed in a 2004 examination.
recorded and the examining party has the right to have the
135
examination reduced to writing.
The Bankruptcy Code anticipates the dilemma of the debtor
136
who is asked to provide incriminating testimony under oath.
The
Code provides that a debtor may be granted immunity regarding
137
incriminating testimony prior to giving the testimony. If the debtor
is granted immunity and persists in refusing to answer questions, the
138
debtor may be denied a discharge.
If the debtor is not granted
immunity, she may refuse to testify based on a proper assertion of her
139
privilege against self-incrimination.
Although the Code does not specifically define the type or scope
of immunity required to compel the debtor to testify, the Court has
held that the combination of use and derivative use immunity is
140
141
sufficient. Transactional immunity is not required.
Given the complex decisions that a debtor faces, she needs
assistance of counsel to avoid the pitfalls. Counsel’s explanation of
the debtor’s rights and responsibilities at each juncture protects the
debtor against the inadvertent loss of the privilege.
1. Blanket Invocation is Not a “Proper Assertion”
Though the debtor may wish to properly assert her privilege
against self-incrimination, certain requirements must be met for an
assertion to be proper. The privilege may be properly asserted if
there is (1) compelled disclosure that is (2) found to be testimonial

granted. . . .”).
134
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 (2012). A 2004 examination is an examination that
occurs only upon motion of a party in interest as opposed to the 341 meeting which
is mandatory. A court reporter may be present during the 2004 examination.
135
In re Jackson, 13 F. Cas. 204, 205 (E.D.N.C. 1874).
136
See 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006) (stating that subject to any applicable privilege,
the debtor must turn over financial documents).
137
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
138
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(B) (2012) (“[T]he court shall grant the debtor a
discharge, unless the debtor has refused, in the case on the ground of privilege
against self-incrimination, to . . . testify, after the debtor has been granted immunity
with respect to the matter concerning which such privilege was invoked.”).
139
In re Gi Yeong Nam, 245 B.R. 216, 224 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000); In re Potter, 88
B.R. 843 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
140
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 452 (1972).
141
Id.
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142

and (3) incriminatory. A debtor may not use a blanket invocation
143
of the privilege to refuse to answer all questions in a proceeding.
Instead, a debtor must be ready to show, related to each question,
144
that there is a real danger of incrimination, that there is some
145
nexus of risk, or that the information provided will provide a link in
146
Furthermore,
the chain of information required for prosecution.
the debtor must show that the fear of prosecution is more than
147
fanciful.
The Supreme Court has recognized that these requirements for
invoking privilege create a paradox in that, if a witness is required to
prove the hazard of prosecution, she would be compelled to
surrender the very information and protection that the privilege
148
against self-incrimination is designed to protect.
To avoid this
result, some courts have required the debtor to explain the
incriminatory nature of specific questions under oath, in camera, or by
149
affidavit. The debtor may not use the privilege as a basis to refuse
150
to attend the section 341 meeting of creditors or to refuse to

142

In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 430–31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
Id. at 430; accord In re Brandenberg, No. 06-30709, 2007 WL 117391 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. Jan 10, 2007); see also In re ICS Cybertronics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 829
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a former officer of a corporation was not
entitled to issue a blanket refusal to testify at an examination under FED. R. BANKR. P.
2004, but was ordered to answer each question propounded to him unless he
proffered particularized responses to each, explaining some nexus between the risk
of criminal prosecution and the information requested).
144
In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 167 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Mudd, 95 B.R. 426,
427 (Bankr. D. Tex. 1989).
145
Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 634 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1980).
146
In re French, 127 B.R. 434, 440 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (holding that a
Chapter 11 debtor, charged with a felony, may assert her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination at the first meeting of creditors without losing her right to
discharge if the debtor is not offered immunity, but must do so as to each question
posed, and that where the questions would potentially furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute, no further inquiry is needed).
147
In re Mart, 90 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (permitting a discharge
where the debtor was potentially involved in her husband’s alleged criminal conduct
and invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the
fear of prosecution was more than fanciful); see also In re Johnson, 387 B.R. 728 (S.D.
Ohio 2008) (denying the debtor a discharge where the debtor purported to “plead
the Fifth” in refusing to answer questions at the first meeting of creditors, but where
there was no fear of prosecution; rather, the debtor was blatantly trying to avoid
cooperation with the Trustee).
148
See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951).
149
In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 445, 447–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)
150
In re Russell, 392, B.R. 315, 368 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008).
143
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provide the required schedules and statement of financial affairs.

151

2. The Timing and Consequence of Asserting of the
Privilege
A debtor may make a proper assertion of her right against self152
incrimination throughout the bankruptcy process. She may invoke
her right in the completion of the bankruptcy schedules, during oral
testimony, and responding to requests for production of documents.
However, while the debtor may avoid exposing herself to
incrimination through her direct testimony, she may be subject to
other consequences. Among other things, adverse inferences may be
drawn in the bankruptcy proceedings, adversary proceedings, Rule
153
154
2004 examinations, and criminal proceedings.
3. Invocation in the Petition and Schedules
The Code requires that a debtor file a list of creditors, a
schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and
current expenses, a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs, and
155
other schedules.
The Code gives the court discretion to allow a

151

Id at 361.
See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 371 (2010) (stating that a suspect’s
Miranda right to remain silent, stop questioning, or request counsel must be invoked
“unambiguously”) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)). It must
be reasoned that a civil litigant in a non-custodial context, including the debtor,
would not be allowed to invoke the privilege more easily, and thus the best practice is
to invoke the privilege through an assertion that is unambiguous.
153
Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Sutherlin 109 B.R. 700, 706 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1989) (holding that the Receiver of an insolvent bank was entitled to rely upon
and draw a negative inference from Debtor’s invocation of his 5th Amendment rights
during a 2004 examination in motion to dismiss case); In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
836 F.2d 1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he trier of fact may also use the silence of a
deponent for relevant inference that it creates.”); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., v.
Frenville, 67 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986) (using adverse inferences to deny
dischargability to certain debts where the debtor asserted the Fifth Amendment in
response to questions regarding their dischargability); In re Hanson, 225 B.R. 366,
371 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that a debtor who invoked the Fifth
Amendment privilege throughout the discovery process for an adversarial
proceeding was not allowed to waive the privilege on the day of trial and testify
because of unfair prejudice and surprise).
154
Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285
U.S. 549 (1932) (“It is our opinion that defendant, by filing the schedules in
bankruptcy without objection, waived his privilege as to any use to which such
schedules would be put, including evidence in a criminal prosecution.”); see infra
Part III.B.1.
155
11 U.S.C. § 521 (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 1009, 4002, & 9011.
152
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156

debtor to omit certain information.
Historically, courts have
allowed the debtor to refrain from turning over incriminating
157
schedules. Courts have held that debtors must complete schedules
when there is clearly no direct and apparent self-incrimination that
158
necessarily attaches to the information required by the schedules.
However, if the court finds that the debtor’s refusal to provide
information required by the Code is justified under the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, it may excuse
159
compliance with the requirement.
4. Production of Documents
At various times throughout the bankruptcy proceedings, the
debtor may be asked to produce documents related to the
160
bankruptcy estate, which is created by the filing of the petition.
Examples of such documents include bank statements, tax returns,
deeds, and titles. As in other types of civil cases, the Supreme Court
has held that the incriminating contents of documents in the
debtor’s possession are not privileged because there has been no
compulsion to create the documents, and the documents were
161
created voluntarily prior to the request for turnover. However, the
Court has found that the act of producing documents itself may be
sufficiently testimonial to warrant Fifth Amendment protection, even
though information in certain documents may contain incriminating
162
information.
For instance, by producing the documents, the
debtor may be making admissions that (1) the documents exist, (2)
156

See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he debtor shall file a list of creditors;
and unless the court orders otherwise, [other schedules].”) (emphasis added).
157
See, e.g., In re Kanter, 117 F. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1902); In re U.S. Hoffman Can
Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 629 (3d Cir. 1967).
158
See, e.g., In re Arend, 286 F. 516, 517–18 (2d Cir. 1922); Padolin v. Lesher
Warner Dry Goods Co., 210 F. 97, 102–04 (3d Cir. 1914).
159
In re U.S. Hoffman Can Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 626–27 (3d Cir. 1967); In re
Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 447–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Kaufman, 35 B.R. 26, 28
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1983).
160
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). The commencement of a case creates an estate
comprised of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the estate wherever located and by whomever held except as
provided by § 541(b) and (c)(2). The trustee is the representative of the estate. See
11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2012). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4) “[T]he debtor shall . . .
surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information,
including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate,
whether or not immunity is granted under section 344 of this title . . . .” (emphasis added).
161
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 n.11 (1976).
162
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (1976).
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that the documents are in the possession and control of the debtor,
or (3) that the debtor believes that the documents she produces are
the documents that were requested, thereby authenticating the
163
documents.
In such a case, a grant of use and derivative use
164
immunity is required in order to compel the testimony sought.
The first step in determining whether a debtor may invoke her
privilege against self-incrimination and thus refuse to produce
documents is to determine whether the documents are property of
165
the debtor’s estate.
The privilege against self-incrimination only
166
applies to property in which the debtor holds title. If the title to the
documents is vested in the bankruptcy estate or another third party,
the debtor may not be able to invoke her privilege to suppress the
167
documents.
If the requested documents are property of the
bankruptcy estate, courts have found that the turnover of those assets
is not testimonial and is therefore not in conflict with the privilege
168
against self-incrimination.
Courts disagree on the proper test for deciding whether
requested documents are property of the debtor’s estate for the
purpose of asserting the privilege. One view is that possession alone
is a sufficient basis for assertion of the privilege. The Ninth Circuit
163

In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 (1984); see discussion infra note 171.
165
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (defining property of the estate). Property
claimed as exempt is property of the estate until the court allows the exemption or
the time for objections to exemptions has lapsed. In re Bucchino, 439 B.R. 761, 770–
71 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2010); In re Campbell, 313 B.R. 313, 320–21 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
2004); In re Calvin, 329 B.R. 589, 601–02 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. Jimenez, 406 B.R. 935, 940–45 (D. N.M. 2008), vacated, 7-05-15473 MA, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108903 (Bankr. D. N.M. Apr. 7, 2009). For the duration that
documents are property of the estate, the trustee would potentially be able to
examine (and even photocopy) anything incriminating. In those jurisdictions that
require the debtor to have ownership and possession to assert the privilege (see infra
notes 169 and 171), the debtor would not technically be able to assert the privilege in
this time period. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2006) and FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1) for
requirement to file claim of exemptions and procedure for objections.
166
Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 149–50 (1923); Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 92, 93–
94 (1923).
167
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4) (2006); United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 517–18 (3d Cir. 1971); see also In re
Lufkin, 255 B.R. 204, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that a Debtor-Attorney
could not assert the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to prevent a
receiver, who had been appointed to take possession of law firm prior to involuntary
bankruptcy, from disclosing documents to a Trustee).
168
See In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330, 340–41 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1985); In re Deveraux, 48
B.R. 644, 646 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985); In re Crabtree, 39 B.R. 726, 732 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1984); In re Kaufman, 35 B.R. 26, 27–28 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1983).
164
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has held that possession of the documents by the debtor may be a
169
That
necessary and sufficient condition to invoke the privilege.
court reasoned that even if the debtor did not own the requested
documents, there is the same potential for incrimination based on
170
identification, possession, and authentication.
If however, the
documents are not property of the estate and the debtor is in
possession of the documents, then the debtor must show that the act
of producing the documents is sufficiently testimonial to warrant
171
Fifth Amendment protection.
The other view is that ownership and possession are necessary.
For instance, the Second Circuit has held that ownership of documents
172
is essential to suppress them on Fifth Amendment grounds.
In
order to rightfully assert her privilege against self-incrimination, a
debtor must show ownership and possession of the requested
173
documents, and she must show that they are self-incriminatory.
5. Assertion of the Privilege in Oral Testimony
During bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor is expected to give
oral testimony at the meeting of creditors and may be asked to testify
174
at 2004 exams or certain hearings. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 344, the
debtor may be granted immunity regarding her oral testimony under
Part V of Title 18 of the United States Code for the purposes of this
175
examination. Neither the Criminal Code nor the Bankruptcy Code
specifies the type of immunity to be granted, but the Court has held
that a grant of use and derivative use immunity is sufficient to compel
176
the debtor to testify under oath.
If the debtor is not offered immunity, the debtor may refuse to
177
testify under the privilege and still retain her right to a discharge.
The use of the privilege in chapter 7 consumer cases is well

169

United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967).
Id.
171
In re Ross, 156 B.R. 272, 275–77 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
172
Falley, 489 F.2d at 41.
173
Id.
174
11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004.
175
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
176
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
177
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A) (2006); In re Minton Grp, Inc., 43 B.R. 705, 709
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Salzman, 61 B.R. 878, 889 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re
Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
170
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178

documented.
However, assertion of the privilege in a chapter 13
proceeding is problematic because of the requirement that the
179
Unless immunity is
debtor’s plan be submitted in good faith.
granted, the privilege may be invoked to avoid incriminating
questions or offering other incriminating information considered
180
testimonial whether during discovery or trial.
The debtor may
invoke the privilege in bankruptcy to justify a refusal to provide
181
information otherwise relevant to the administration of the estate.
B. Adverse Consequences
1. Adverse Inferences
Though the debtor may properly assert her privilege to avoid
revealing incriminatory evidence, she may face adverse consequences.
When a debtor invokes her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in civil proceedings, adverse inferences may be drawn
182
183
from the invocation by receivers, Trustees, and the Court.
In
some situations, such inferences may lead to certain debts being
184
deemed nondischargeable.

178

Turner, 43 B.R. at 709.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2006); In re Girdaukas, 92 B.R. 373, 376 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1988) (supporting the use of the Fifth Amendment in Chapter 7, but noting
that it may be difficult for a debtor to establish a good faith plan under Chapter 13
while using the Fifth Amendment privilege).
180
Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11
(11th Cir. 1993).
181
In re Hyde, 235 B.R. 539, 542 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir.
2000).
182
See In re Brandenberg, No. 06-30709, 2007 WL 117391 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan.
10, 2007).
183
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he
trier of fact may also use the silence of a deponent for relevant inferences that it
creates”); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Sutherlin, 109 B.R. 700, 706 (E.D. La. 1989)
(stating that a receiver was entitled to draw a negative inference from the debtor’s
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights during a Rule 2004 examination and rely
upon the inference in its motion to dismiss the case).
184
In re Asbury, Bankr. No. 08-21989, (Adversary No. 09-02012), 2011 WL 44911
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 2011) (relying, in part, on a debtor’s assertion of the Fifth
Amendment as to false statements regarding assets, in determining that the chapter
7 debts were non-dischargeable under 523(a)(2)(B)); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
v. Frenville, 67 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986) (using adverse inferences to deny
dischargeability to certain debts where the debtor asserted the 5th Amendment to
questions regarding their dischargeability).
179
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2. Denial of Discharge
185

The court may deny a discharge if the debtor has refused in
the case to obey a lawful order of the court, to testify to selfincriminating matters after being granted immunity, or to respond to
a question approved by the court without a proper assertion of the
186
right against self-incrimination.
If the debtor refuses a court
ordered inspection of documents, there is no violation of the Code if
the refusal is based on a proper assertion of the right against self187
incrimination.
Although a 2004 exam is another instance in which a debtor may
assert the privilege, the bankruptcy court does not implicitly certify
188
questions posed at a Rule 2004 examination. Thus, validly asserting
a debtor’s Fifth Amendment rights, without more, is not sufficient
189
grounds to deny a discharge.
3. Inability to Testify in Other Proceedings
Some consequences may affect the debtor’s ability to testify in
subsequent or contemporaneous (parallel) proceedings.
For
instance, if a debtor has refused to testify in prior proceedings based
on a proper assertion of her rights, then the debtor may be barred
from testifying in a later proceeding to any matters that were raised
190
or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.
The debtor’s
inability to testify in a later proceeding complicates strategic planning
for future proceedings and makes assessment of the impact on
anticipated proceedings difficult, if not impossible.

185

11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)–(12) (2006). The Chapter 7 discharge provision lists
twelve grounds for objection to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) and (c) (2006) lists
the grounds for objection to discharge in chapter 13. The grounds for objection to
discharge in Chapter 12 are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a) and (c) (2006). The
grounds for objection to the discharge for an individual debtor in Chapter 11 are
listed at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2006).
186
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (2006).
187
See In re Bartel, No. 05-13134, 2009 WL 2461727, (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 10,
2009).
188
See In re Merena, 413 B.R. 792, 819 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009), aff’d, In re Merena,
No. 08-60066-7, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 5531 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2009).
189
See In re Ogden, No. UT-98-042, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1976, at *7 (10th Cir.
B.A.P. (Utah)).
190
See, e.g., In re Nat’l Audit Def. Network, 367 B.R. 207, 216–17 (Bankr. D. Nev.
2007); United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 504–07 (W.D.N.Y.
1994); In re Hanson, 225 B.R. 366, 372 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, No. 99-CV-55,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8442 (W.D. Mich. June 1, 1999).
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4. Contempt of Court and Imprisonment
Another consequence the debtor may face is contempt of
191
court. A proper invocation of the privilege in one hearing does not
192
automatically carry the privilege over to subsequent hearings. If the
debtor asserts her privilege as to certain questions in one hearing, but
testifies to those facts in a later hearing, she is not entitled to then re193
assert her privilege as to those matters.
If the debtor disobeys a
court order regarding those matters, supposing to rely on her
previously asserted privilege, the court may use its contempt power to
194
impose sanctions on the debtor, including fines and imprisonment.
5. Dismissal of the Bankruptcy
Even if the debtor’s Fifth Amendment assertion of the privilege
is properly based, her case may be dismissed if her assertion hampers
195
the trustee’s ability to administer the bankruptcy estate. The court
may dismiss the case with or without prejudice. If the court dismisses
the case without prejudice, the debtor may file her petition after the
196
threat of prosecution passes.
Although this may seem like a
reasonable solution, it is problematic for the debtor because the
protection afforded against creditors’ claims is lost when the
automatic stay is no longer in place. In addition, there are negative
implications for the debtor in attempting to file another bankruptcy
197
within the succeeding year.
191

11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020; see also supra note 118.
See In re Weerawat, No. 06-40098-JBR, 2007 WL 710160 (Bankr. D. Mass. Mar.
6, 2007).
193
Id.
194
Id.; see also Martin-Trigona v. Belford, 732 F.2d 170, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1984); In
re Sterling-Harris Ford, Inc., 315 F.2d 277, 278–79 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 814 (1963).
195
See In re Blan, 239 B.R. 385, 397–98 (W.D. Ark. 1999); In re Moses, 792 F. Supp.
529, 532–36, 38 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Fekos, 148 B.R. 10 (Bankr. W.D.
Penn. 1992); Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(stating that a court could dismiss a petition sua sponte if it found that the trustee
was unable to administer the estate), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1190 (1995); In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 446–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
196
See In re Pelko, 201 B.R. 331, 333–34 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996).
197
11 U.S.C. §362(c)(3) (2006). The refiling of a consumer bankruptcy case by
an individual after a dismissal within the preceding one year period of a pending
consumer case other than under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) results in the termination of the
stay with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case. The
court may extend the stay only after notice and a hearing. The debtor has the
burden of demonstrating that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the
creditors to be stayed. A case is presumed not to be in good faith, and the
presumption must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
192
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6. Implications in Criminal Proceedings
Invocation or waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination in
bankruptcy may have consequences in the criminal prosecution
198
context as well.
Absent immunity, plaintiffs may invoke the Fifth
Amendment in response to incriminating questions during discovery
199
or trial at any stage of the criminal process. Although a bankruptcy
200
court may enforce a validly issued protective order, a grand jury
subpoena may take precedence over a validly issued protective
201
order.
This leaves the debtor at risk during the pendency of the
bankruptcy even when the incriminating information appears to be
protected.
C. Waiver of the Privilege
A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right is not required in a
202
noncustodial setting.
Thus, it is possible for a debtor to lose the
benefit of the privilege in the context of a bankruptcy without actual
knowledge of the waiver because the setting is viewed as
203
noncustodial.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the privilege is waived
204
if it is not invoked.
In other words, the privilege is not selfexecuting. Under certain circumstances, the waiver may be inferred
from a witness’ course of conduct or prior statements concerning the

198

See, e.g., In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 278–79 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (“That is one of
the misfortunes of bankruptcy if it follows crime. The right not to be compelled to
be a witness against oneself is not a right to appropriate property that may tell one’s
story.”).
199
Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11
(11th Cir. 1993).
200
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1979).
201
In re Grand Jury Subpoena served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, 62 F.3d
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1995).
202
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
203
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (holding that citizen is not in
custody if a reasonable person in his situation would have felt free to “terminate the
interrogation and leave”); Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1990). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006), (stating that the traditional rule that “a
waiver will not be lightly inferred,” applies in involuntary cases), with In re Hulon, 92
B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating that a waiver will also not be lightly
inferred even in a voluntary case).
204
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (stating that he privilege
against self-incrimination is waived if it is not invoked) (citing United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931)).
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205

subject of the case. The waiver is not to be lightly inferred, and the
courts indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a
206
However, the mere fact that a waiver may be
testimonial waiver.
inferred creates a danger of inadvertent incrimination for the debtor.
Courts will infer that an individual waived the privilege if the
statements have created a significant likelihood that the finder of fact
will be prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth, and the debtor
had reason to know that her prior statements would be interpreted as
207
a waiver.
Filing bankruptcy schedules and statements may constitute a
208
waiver of the privilege. In an adversary proceeding, filing an answer
209
and responding to discovery requests may cause a waiver. Likewise,
an affidavit operates like a testimonial statement and may be
210
On the other hand, answering some
interpreted as a waiver.
questions prior to asserting the privilege will not necessarily operate
211
as a waiver as to all questions presented.
Because there is no clear line of demarcation to signal the
unintentional waiver of the privilege by inference, the debtor is at
risk to unwittingly allow access to both disclosed and undisclosed
212
information.
This may occur based on a witness’s course of
conduct or prior statements concerning the case and without an
inquiry into whether or not the witness was aware of the privilege and

205

In re Litton, 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987).
In re Hulon, 92 B.R. at 673 (citing Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir.
1981)) (stating that waiver is not to be lightly inferred, and courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against finding a testimonial waiver; waiver inferred if (1)
the statements have created a significant likelihood that the finder of fact will be left
with and prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth; and (2) the debtor had
reason to know that her prior statements would be interpreted as a waiver). But see
Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. at 675 (stating that a debtor is before the Bankruptcy Court
voluntarily and is not entitled to as much consideration in being compelled to testify
as another witness would who had no interest in the proceeding).
207
In re Hulon, 92 B.R. at 673.
208
See In re Kroh, 87 B.R. 1004, 1005–06 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
209
Id.
210
In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1307–08 (4th Cir. 1991).
211
In re Jacques, 115 B.R. 272, 273 (D. Nev. 1990).
212
With regard to the requested items which may not have been previously
disclosed, or to the extent that such commitment may not be legally binding, the
privilege has been lost or waived for failure to have raised it timely. As the Supreme
Court held: “[A] witness loses the privilege by failing to claim it properly even though
the information being sought remains undisclosed when the privilege is claimed.” In re
Lederman, 140 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976)).
206
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213

chose to waive it consciously.

1. Depositions and 2004 Examinations
The bankruptcy debtor is more at risk to unknowingly waive the
privilege than the person in a custodial setting. The debtor may be
deemed to have waived the privilege for purposes of a 2004
examination if she testifies at an earlier deposition on incriminating
matters. This remains true even if her attorney did not advise her of
the privilege or instruct her not to answer in the earlier deposition,
and even if she was not aware at the time that the statements might
214
In similar fashion, the debtor may have waived
be incriminating.
the privilege in bankruptcy proceedings by voluntarily answering
questions and follow-up questions in earlier depositions regarding
the same subject matter, despite the fact that counsel was not present
215
at the depositions and the debtor was not informed of the privilege.
In contrast, the failure to raise the privilege as an objection to
216
subpoenaed documents has been held not to constitute a waiver.
Consequently, the likelihood of inadvertent waiver of the privilege by
the debtor can be seen to increase dramatically depending on the
circumstances.
The debtor’s ability to waive the privilege inadvertently due to
lack of knowledge of its existence places the uninformed debtor at a
serious disadvantage when compared to her more informed
counterpart.
The debtor’s loss of the privilege through the
inadvertence or neglect of counsel highlights the critical importance
of educating the individual debtor and counsel about the privilege.
Without disclosure to the debtor of the existence of the privilege, the
probability of inadvertent waiver and any ensuing negative
consequences falls disproportionately on the poor, the learning
disabled, the uneducated, and the debtor represented by ineffective
counsel, or those in our society who are least able to recover from the
217
waiver and are most likely to suffer the consequences of waiver.
213

In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 193 B.R. 152, 162 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing
Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)).
214
In re A&L Oil Co., 200 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996).
215
In re Cotillion Invs., Inc., 343 B.R. 344, 351–52 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
216
DG Creditor Corp. v. Dabah (In re DG Acquisition Corp.), 151 F.3d 75 (2d Cir.
1998).
217
One author characterizes the case law pertaining to learning disabled adults as
follows:
Colorado v. Connelly held that although the defendant was mentally
ill, his waiver was voluntary, thus valid. . . . The majority reasoned that
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Aside from issues of due process and equal protection under the law,
lack of notice of the privilege goes to the central issue of fundamental
fairness that relates to the projected image and the perceived image
of our system of justice as unbiased, impartial, and evenhanded.
Because legal entities are not considered persons for purposes of
invoking the privilege, an individual’s ability to claim the privilege
may be affected by her prior testimony, actions and events regarding
a legal entity. For instance, the debtor corporation’s principal may
not invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid answering
218
questions at a 2004 examination when she has previously pled guilty
219
in a criminal court on the issues. On the other hand, if the debtor’s
principal answers, “I don’t know” or “I don’t recall” to almost every
question in an earlier deposition, the privilege may be preserved and
claimed in a subsequent deposition despite the fact that it was not
220
formally invoked in the earlier deposition.
2. Schedules
The law is well settled that if the debtor fails to invoke the
privilege at the time she files her schedules, the privilege is waived as
to the facts shown, and the information will be admissible evidence
221
against her in a criminal prosecution.
Because the debtor’s
schedules are required and must be filed with the petition, any
potential for incrimination should be explained to the debtor prior
to the filing. Otherwise, the debtor may inadvertently waive the
privilege, be incriminated irreversibly, face criminal prosecution
based on her own supplied evidence, and suffer a denial of her
discharge. As stated above, the fact that the debtor has not been
properly advised by counsel or does not understand the privilege will
the sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was
based, is governmental coercion. The Court stated that under a due
process analysis, beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, all cases deciding
the constitutionality of a confession have contained a substantial
element of police coercion. The Connelly Court stated that it is not
the role of the Court to make sweeping inquiries into the state of mind
of a criminal defendant who has confessed” unless there is evidence of
police coercion.
Steven A. Greenburg, Learning Disabled Juveniles & Miranda Rights—What Constitutes
Voluntary, Knowing, & Intelligent Waiver, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 487, 494–95
(1991) (citations omitted).
218
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 (“The court may order the examination of any entity.”).
219
In re Cassandra Grp., 338 B.R. 600, 604 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
220
Horowitz v. Sheldon, 193 B.R. 152. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
221
Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592, 599 (1913); Czarlinsky v. United States,
54 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 549 (1932).
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not serve to avoid the waiver or minimize any damage resulting from
222
the admissibility of the evidence.
3. The 341 Meeting
The Court, in addressing the issue of waiver in the context of the
first meeting of creditors, has spoken plainly. If the debtor
voluntarily testifies at the 341 meeting without invoking the privilege,
she may waive the privilege for later proceedings as to all matters
223
related to the scope of her testimony, whether or not her waiver was
224
As noted above, waiver is inferred when
knowing and intelligent.
the testimony creates a significant likelihood that the judge or jury
will rely on a distorted view of the truth, and the debtor has reason to
225
know that her prior statements will be interpreted as a waiver.
Equally problematic is that a blanket invocation of the privilege is not
226
a “proper assertion” and thus will not suffice to protect the debtor.
D. The Dangers of Parallel Proceedings
A debtor faces a particular risk if she is exposed to parallel
proceedings. Parallel proceedings are any simultaneous proceedings
227
based on the same facts that serve as a basis for all of the claims.
222

In re A&L Oil Co., 200 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996).
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 428 (1983) (noting that if the debtor
voluntarily testifies at the 341 meeting without invoking the privilege, she may waive
the privilege for later proceedings as to all matters related to the scope of her
testimony).
224
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654–55, n.9 (1976) (observing that
knowing and intelligent waiver is not required in a noncustodial setting: “an
individual may lose the benefit of the privilege [against self-incrimination] without
making a knowing and intelligent waiver”).
225
In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673–75 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating that waiver
is inferred if the “(1) the statements have created a significant likelihood that the
finder of fact will be left with and prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth, and
(2) the debtor had reason to know that her prior statements would be interpreted as
a waiver of the privilege”).
226
In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that a blanket
assertion of the privilege is not proper where debtor refused to answer 341 questions
and had not scheduled creditors, debts, or assets, and liabilities, and where debtor
provided no evidence of potential criminal investigation. The requisites for asserting
the privilege are 1) a compelled disclosure; 2) found to be testimonial; and 3)
incriminatory). See also In re Brandenberg, No. 06–30709, 2007 WL 117391, at *2
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2007) (finding that a blanket invocation is not
sufficient).
227
See 17 C.F.R. § 12.24 (defining parallel proceedings in the context of
commodity and security exchanges as “[a] civil court proceeding, involving one or
more of the respondents as a party, which is pending at the time the [other]
complaint is filed and involves claims or counterclaims that are based on the same set
223
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This situation arises when the debtor is involved in a bankruptcy and
a criminal proceeding at the same time. As explained below, the risk
of adverse consequences remains even when the debtor claims the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in both
228
proceedings.
Imagine a scenario in which a debtor in bankruptcy is also the
subject of a criminal proceeding. If the debtor were involved in only
the criminal proceeding, the prosecuting authority would be limited
229
in its discovery of information. The trustee in bankruptcy, however,
is entitled to a wider berth during discovery in bankruptcy because a
debtor is mandated to file schedules and answer certain questions
230
under oath. Therefore, the prosecuting authority could have access
to information via the civil proceeding that it can use in the criminal
231
proceeding.
Under some circumstances, if the debtor’s availability for
examination by the trustee is in doubt, the debtor may be arrested by
law enforcement officials, held in custody until a detention hearing,
232
and released only upon certain conditions. If the debtor’s attorney

of facts which serve as a basis for all of the claims in the reparations complaint”);
Christian Babich, Comment, Parallel Proceedings: The Government’s Double-Team
Approach and the Degradation of Constitutional Protections, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 753,
754 (2007); Carl H. Loewenson, Jr., Parallel Proceedings, available at
http://www.mofo.com/files/Publication/b72e0c65-297f-455f-a9bb-6e0b63eb28c2
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bd3bc6f0-6563-4f4b-a3f2-0c18189b5d98
/04PLIDO.pdf (defining parallel proceedings as “two or more investigations or
actions, concerning allegations arising from the same (or substantially the same) set
of facts, proceed simultaneously or successively against the same or related parties”).
228
See Walter P. Loughlin, Fighting on Two Fronts: Parallel Proceedings and Challenges
at the Intersection of Criminal and Civil Law, 32 METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL
(Oct. 1, 2006), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/October
/32.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (outlining restrictions that courts have put on the
government in parallel proceedings).
229
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 115 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (emphasizing limits on discovery rights to the government in criminal cases
based on 18 U.S.C. § 3500); see also infra Part 0
230
11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006) (providing that the debtor shall perform certain duties
including, but not limited to, filing a list of creditors, a schedule of assets and
liabilities, a schedule of income and expenses, a statement of financial affairs, and a
statement of intentions regarding secured property; as well as furnishing the trustee
copies of payroll records, a Federal tax return for the most recent tax year, and
photo identification).
231
One possible procedural remedy is for the bankruptcy court to stay the
proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings so that the debtor
can then proceed with confidence having finally resolved the related issues. See supra
note 196.
232
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)–(g) (2006).
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is not sensitive to these issues, the debtor may be exposed to the
233
unnecessary risk of criminal liability. Although courts have reacted
negatively to the government’s invocation of both civil and criminal
processes in parallel proceedings, such conduct is not prohibited,
234
and still presents a risk of inadvertent disclosure to a debtor.
1. Protective Orders and Grand Jury Subpoenas
The problematic nature of parallel proceedings can be seen in
the procedural interplay between competing parties and the courts in
separate civil and criminal actions. One example is when a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum conflicts with a protective order. The Courts
of Appeal have sometimes reached different results in similar
235
situations.
In one instance, a protective order enforced by the bankruptcy
court to quash a subpoena duces tecum from the United States Attorney
236
was deemed a “de facto grant of immunity,”
despite the court’s
233

68% of the 1,245,205 licensed attorneys in the U.S. are in private practice.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Lawyer Demographics (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/Public
Documents/lawyer_demographics_2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf).
The
Martindale-Hubbell database lists 39,126 bankruptcy attorneys in the United States.
Only 4,756 attorneys are listed as practicing both bankruptcy and criminal law.
MARTINDALE.COM,http://www.martindale.com/Results.aspx?ft=1&frm=freesearch&af
s=Bankruptcy (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).) Arguably, those 4,756 attorneys are better
prepared to raise the Fifth Amendment in bankruptcy proceedings because their
practice would encounter it on a more regular basis.
234
See
Loughlin,
supra
note
228
at
32
(Oct.
1,
2006)
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/ October/32.pdf (last visited Aug. 16,
2013) (outlining restrictions that courts have put on the government in parallel
proceedings).
235
Compare Martindell v. ITT, 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Absent a
showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some
extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, a witness should be entitled to rely
upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties.”), with In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that a valid
protective order was not sufficient grounds to quash the subpoena duces tecum), In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1020 (11th Cir.
1993) (stating that a Rule 26(c) protective order does not shield relevant
information from a later grand jury investigation), and In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, 62 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1995)
(adopting a per se rule that grand jury subpoenas take precedence over validly issued
Rule 26(c) protective orders).
236
In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Under Seal), 836 F.2d 1468, 1475 (4th Cir. 1988)
(stating that a protective order, when enforced by the bankruptcy court to quash a
subpoena duces tecum from the U.S. Attorney, works as a “de facto grant of
immunity,” however, 6003(a) states that the power to choose who may receive
immunity is exclusively within the Executive Branch).
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acknowledgement that the power to grant immunity is reserved to the
237
In one case, the court gave precedence to a
Executive Branch.
grand jury subpoena over a valid protective order compelling the
238
debtor to produce incriminating documents.
In yet another case, the court held that absent a showing of
improvidence in the grant of a protective order, exceptional
circumstance, or compelling need, a witness is entitled to rely on the
enforceability of a protective order against any third parties,
239
including the government. The court held that a protective order
should not be vacated or modified merely to accommodate the state’s
desire to inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal
investigation, either as evidence or as the subject of a possible perjury
240
charge.
Even when the protective order is given precedence over the
grand jury subpoena, the trier of fact may be permitted to draw an
241
inference from the witness’s silence.
Nevertheless, the Court has
held that the witness may not be compelled against a valid assertion
of the Fifth Amendment privilege to repeat prior “immunized
testimony” verbatim without a contemporaneous assurance of
242
immunity. The Court’s holding also extended to the compulsion of
closely tracking testimony by the witness as it relates to prior
243
“immunized testimony.”
2. Differences in Civil and Criminal Discovery
Neither party is obliged to reveal much information during the
discovery process in criminal proceedings. Under the Federal Rules,
a defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to receive only his
own statements, his prior criminal record, items that are “material to
preparing the defense,” items the government plans to use in its case244
in-chief, and items belonging to or obtained from the defendant.
237

In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1020
(11th Cir. 1993) (stating that a Rule 26(c) protective order does not shield relevant
information from a later grand jury investigation).
238
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes), 62 F.3d
1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1995).
239
Martindell v. ITT, 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979); See also In re Grand Jury
Subpoena (Roach), 138 F.3d 442, 445 (1st Cir. 1998).
240
Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296.
241
In re Grand Jury Subpoena under seal, 836 F.2d 1468, 1476. (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
242
Pilsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263 (1983).
243
Id.
244
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1); See Loewenson, supra note 227.
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Additionally, the defendant is required to disclose only evidence for
her case-in-chief, and only where the defendant made a reciprocal
245
request.
In a civil action, however, both parties are entitled to all relevant,
non-privileged material “reasonably calculated to lead to the
246
discovery of admissible evidence.”
Thus, the scope of discovery in
civil actions is often limited only by the zeal of the litigants. The
evidentiary standard while perhaps excluding “witch hunts” may
247
often fairly be characterized as a “fishing expedition.”
Litigants are not required to prove that a line of inquiry will lead
248
to admissible evidence. Instead, they are merely required to make a
249
In other words,
reasonable argument that the information could.
access to information in the civil setting hinges on whether, in the
estimation of the court, a litigant’s particular inquiry may arguably
capture information that points toward admissible evidence. While
this discovery rule leaves some information off limits, it rightfully
encourages the parties’ search for the truth by providing a flexible,
250
fluid, and somewhat unpredictable standard.
3. Discovery in Bankruptcy and the Risk of Loss of the
Privilege
In bankruptcy, the discovery provisions are similar to those of
other civil proceedings, but distinctive in many ways. Each form of
discovery creates an opportunity for loss of the privilege. For
example, the Code requires the debtor to appear at a meeting
convened by the United States Bankruptcy trustee for oral
251
examination under oath.
This meeting is similar to a public
deposition and is referred to as the meeting of creditors or 341
meeting. The debtor in each case is subject to interrogation by any
appearing creditor, the panel trustee, any examiner in the case, and

245

See Loewenson, supra note 227. But see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
(finding that the state has an obligation to furnish exculpatory evidence in its
possession).
246
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(1); see Loewenson, supra note 227, at 24–25.
247
See Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
248
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (emphasis
added).
249
Id.
250
See Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, U. A.,
657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981).
251
11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). See supra Part III.C.3.
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252

the United States trustee.
The scope of the examination is limited to “the acts, conduct,
property, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, and any
other matter that may affect the administration of the debtor’s estate
253
or to the debtor’s right to a discharge.”
The Code description of
the examination’s scope appears restrictive by use of the phrase
“[t]he examination . . . may relate only to,” yet when the provision is
read in its entirety, the breadth of the permitted inquiry is notably
254
sweeping and detailed. Refusal or inability of the debtor to attend
the 341 meeting, to furnish information required by the Code, or to
cooperate with the trustee may result in dismissal of the bankruptcy,
255
conversion, or denial of the discharge.
In addition to the requirement that the debtor testify at the 341
meeting, the court may order the examination of the debtor on the
256
motion of any party in interest.
Such examinations are often
referred to as 2004 examinations and the scope of inquiry is the same
257
as for the 341 meeting. The debtor may be compelled to attend the
examination in the same manner as a witness at a trial in a United
258
The court may designate that the debtor be
States District Court.
259
examined at any time and place.
4. The Debtor’s Failure to Appear, Incarceration, and the
Need for Notice of the Privilege
The debtor may be held in custody and treated as a criminal in
some instances even though no criminal charges have been filed. If
the debtor is deemed necessary for the proper administration of the
estate, and is alleged by affidavit to be avoiding examination, the
252

11 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(b).
254
See id.
255
11 U.S.C. § 707 (a)(1) (providing that the court may dismiss a case under
Chapter 7 for cause including unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to
creditors); 11 U.S.C. § 521 (i)(4),(j)(1) (providing that the court may decline to
dismiss the case if the debtor tried in good faith to file the required information and
that the best interests of the creditors would be served by administration of the
estate; or if the debtor failed to file a tax return that becomes due after
commencement of the case, the court shall convert or dismiss the case whichever is
in the best interests of the creditors and the estate).
256
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a) (emphasis added).
257
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(b); See supra Part III.C.1.
258
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9016 (incorporating by reference
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 and thus providing for the form, issuance and service of subpoenas
ad testificandum and duces tecum for trials, hearings, and depositions).
259
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(d).
253
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court may order law enforcement to bring the debtor to court
260
The grounds for such an order include a sworn
without delay.
allegation that “there is reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is
about to leave or has left [her] residence or principal place of
business to avoid examination;” or has willfully disobeyed a subpoena
261
or order to appear for examination.
Whenever the debtor is found in a judicial district other than
that from which the order was issued, the debtor may be taken into
custody and removed either to the court issuing the order or the
nearest available United States magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, or
262
district judge.
If the judge finds that the person in custody is the debtor, the
debtor is released on conditions to ensure her prompt appearance
263
before the court that issued the order to compel attendance.
In
deciding conditions to assure the debtor’s attendance for
examination, obedience for further examination, and appearance for
purposes of removal from another jurisdiction, the court is governed
264
by the provisions and policies of the federal criminal code.
The
applicable section with regard to release or detention pending trial
provides a number of factors that the court must consider with an eye
towards the imposition of the least restrictive means of securing the
265
attendance of the debtor. The debtor may, in this circumstance, be
taken into custody, held until the detention hearing, and be dealt
with in all respects as a criminal defendant pending her rebuttal of
266
the allegations based on an affidavit. In this situation, the debtor is
clearly in a custodial setting, albeit in a bankruptcy proceeding, and
the debtor should be provided notice of her privilege against self267
incrimination. Yet, despite the obvious need for notice, there is no
260

FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(a).
Id.
262
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(b).
263
Id.
264
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)–(b) (2006) (defining the
offense of failure to appear and providing for punishment for failure to appear in
criminal proceedings).
265
18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)–(g) (2006) (setting forth the court’s procedure in
detention hearings in criminal proceedings and the factors to be considered).
266
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c); see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)–(g) (2012) (setting forth the
court’s procedure in detention hearings in criminal proceedings and the factors to
be considered).
267
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that an individual
under custodial interrogation is entitled to warning (notice) of her rights to remain
silent, end questioning, and to an attorney); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
261
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provision requiring that such notice be given.
E. The Compulsion of Testimony
268

As noted above, immunity is a term of art with many nuanced
meanings that depend on context. The types of immunity that are
relevant for the purposes of this Article are transactional immunity,
use immunity, and derivative use immunity. Transactional immunity
is a grant of immunity that shields the witness from any exposure to
269
criminal liability that is related to a particular transaction.
Use
immunity is more limited than transactional immunity: the witness is
protected only from the “use” of the witness’ testimony in any
270
criminal proceeding against the witness. The value of the privilege
against self-incrimination is reduced when use immunity, rather than
transactional immunity, is used to supplant the debtor’s privilege
because of the degree to which protection from criminal prosecution
271
is lost. Derivative use immunity is closely related to use immunity.
The use of evidence that is derived from the witness’ testimony,
“fruits” of the immunized testimony, is denied to the state when the
272
debtor is given derivative use immunity.
The law has changed over time as it relates to the type of
immunity that suffices to justify the compulsion of testimony in the
273
face of the proper assertion of the privilege. Under prior law, the
debtor was allowed to refuse to answer incriminating questions even
274
though the Bankruptcy Act (the Act) provided automatic limited use
659 (2004) (holding that citizen is not in custody if a reasonable person in his
situation would have felt free to “terminate the interrogation and leave”).
268
See supra Part I.E.
269
See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
270
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964),
abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 542 U.S. 666 (2007).
271
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 466–67, (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
272
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 (“[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state
witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under
federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner
by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.”).
273
Counselman, 142 U.S. at 547 (required transactional immunity); Kastigar, 406
U.S. at 441 (1972) (overruling Counselman on that point and substituted use and
derivative use immunity as a sufficient basis to compel testimony as against an
assertion of the privilege).
274
The immunity was limited in two ways. The protection afforded was restricted
to the debtor’s testimony, not documents, and even the testimony could be used in
hearings on objections to discharge. United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974, 981 (5th
Cir. 1974) (“Nor does that immunity extend, as the appellant would have it, to
certain of his books and records introduced in evidence against him at trial.”); 11
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275

immunity. The Act was the immediate predecessor to the modern276
day Code and required the debtor to testify in all circumstances.
The debtor’s refusal to answer any material question could result in
277
the denial of the debtor’s discharge.
The debtor was expected to
be forthcoming even on incriminating matters because the Act
278
granted use immunity automatically.
The Court has altered the type of immunity necessary to compel
testimony in the face of a proper assertion of the privilege. The
Court has moved from a rule, mandating transactional immunity in
279
exchange for “immunized testimony” to a rule that permits the
compulsion of privileged testimony through use immunity and
280
derivative use immunity. Debtors, debtors’ counsel, and the courts
have been affected in dramatically different ways by the Court’s
decisions and the exceptions to the exercise of the privilege that
allow compulsion of incriminating documents after assertion of the
281
privilege without a grant of immunity.
U.S.C. 25(a)(10) (repealed 1978) (“[N]o testimony, or any evidence which is directly
or indirectly derived from such testimony, given by him shall be offered in evidence
against him in any criminal proceeding, except such testimony as may be given by him in
the hearing upon objections to his discharge. . . .” (emphasis added)).
275
In re Rosser, 96 F. 305 (E.D. Mo. 1899) (finding that refusal was allowed where
debtor refused to answer certain questions before a referee on the ground of selfincrimination, despite the fact that § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act gave use immunity to
the debtor).
276
11 USC § 25(a)(10) (repealed 1978) (finding that a debtor is required to
testify in all circumstances).
277
11 USC § 32(c)(6) (repealed 1978) (finding that refusal to answer a material
question was grounds for a denial of a discharge).
278
11 USC § 25(a)(10) (repealed 1978) (discussing statutory grant of use
immunity).
279
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585–86 (1892).
280
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972).
281
Compulsion of the production of incriminating documents has been allowed
after proper assertion of the privilege and without a grant of immunity thus creating
exceptions to the exercise of the privilege under various theories including a
corporate records exception, public records exception, a required records
exception, and an exception based on the assumption of custodial duties under a
required regulatory regime. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911)
(finding that if corporate papers are records of an organization or “collective entity”
with a duty to keep records, no Fifth Amendment privilege attached); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 119 B.R. 945, 949–50 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (finding that
documents that Chapter 7 trustee had to maintain in his official capacity as trustee of
bankruptcy estate qualified as “public records,” which trustee could be required to
produce under public records exception to Fifth Amendment); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon Underhill, 781 F.2d 64, 67(6th Cir. 1986);
Balt. City Dept. of Social Servs v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) (finding that a
person may not claim the Amendment’s protections based upon the incrimination
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1. Procedure for the Grant of Immunity
282

Under Part V of Title 18, whenever a witness refuses to testify
in a court proceeding based on her privilege against selfincrimination, an Assistant United States Attorney must first seek the
U.S. Attorney’s permission to refer the matter to an Assistant
Attorney General (AAG), and then must obtain the approval of the
AAG for the Criminal Division or the AAG for the division of the
283
Department of Justice accountable for the case.
If an AAG other
than the AAG for the Criminal Division approves the request, the
284
approval of the AAG for the Criminal Division is also necessary. An
Assistant U.S. Attorney may then file the necessary motion in the
District Court requesting an order granting the debtor immunity
285
related to that testimony.
If use and derivative use immunity are granted, the debtor may
286
not lawfully refuse to testify to those issues. However, no testimony
or other information compelled under the order, or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or information may
be used against the debtor in any criminal case, except for
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing
287
to comply with the order. The protection that the grant of use and
derivative use immunity affords the debtor from exposure to criminal
liability is beneficial but problematic.
As noted above, use and derivative use immunity combined do
not provide the debtor the same level of protection as transactional
immunity and leave the debtor open to criminal sanctions based on
that may result from the “unadorned act of producing the child” or the “contents or
nature of the thing demanded”).
282
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (2006).
283
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-23. 110-310 (1992). As an
alternative, informal or “hip pocket” immunity may be granted. The debtor should
still be cautious of this form of immunity as it arises from no statutory provision, is
discretionary with the prosecutor, and is not binding on any other jurisdiction.
Courts have frowned upon the practice, but have accepted it as the promise not to
prosecute is of value. United States v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1985)
(“The propriety of using informal immunity has been frequently upheld.”); United
States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011
(1983); United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 939 (1976); see also United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658, 662–63 (10th
Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).”).
284
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-23.130 (1992).
285
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003 (2006); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S
MANUAL § 9-23,310 (1992).
286
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2006).
287
Id.
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evidence unrelated to her testimony. In addition, the grant of
immunity does not prevent the use of the debtor’s testimony to prove
elements of a crime in the bankruptcy proceeding as a basis for
288
denial of discharge.
In short, the grant of use and derivative use
immunity in bankruptcy proceedings may lessen the possibility of
bringing criminal charges, but it does not fully protect the debtor
from criminal punishment, civil liability, or a denial of discharge.
Considering the disadvantages the debtor faces if she testifies
after the court issues a grant of immunity, the debtor might still be
tempted to refuse to testify. That also is problematic. The debtor’s
refusal to testify after a grant of use and derivative use immunity is
grounds for a global objection to discharge and a basis for the court’s
289
denial of discharge. In addition, the debtor’s refusal to testify after
a grant of immunity may subject her to contempt proceedings and
290
sanctions including fines and imprisonment.
In other words,
whether the debtor testifies after a grant of use and derivative use
immunity, or whether the debtor refuses to testify after a grant of use
291
immunity, the debtor risks going to jail and a denial of discharge.
292
What may seem a Hobson’s Choice is, for the truly innocent debtor,
293
more akin to Sophie’s Choice, and commentators explored this but
294
Congress and the courts largely ignore or accept it.
If the United States Attorney does not request immunity for the
debtor, or if immunity is not offered, then the debtor may refuse to
testify, invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

288

In re Leslie, 119 F. 406, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1903).
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (2012).
290
In re Martin-Trigona, 732 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1984).
291
See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967) (holding that in a
prosecution for conspiracy to obstruct justice a choice between self-incrimination
and job forfeiture was coercion that violated the privilege against self-incrimination).
292
A Hobson’s Choice is a free choice with only one option offered.
293
The term Sophie’s Choice, after the novel and film of the same name, refers
to a choice between two unbearable options. Sophie’s Choice was undeniably more
horrific than the scenario posed here for Sophie Debtor.
294
Craig P. Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth of Consequences: The Dilemma of
Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy Proceedings,
76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 559–60 (1997); Laurie K. Jones, Bankruptcy Courts and the
Reluctant Witness: Why A Rule 26(c) Protective Order Is Not A Substitute for A Grant of
Immunity When the Witness Refuses to Testify Based Upon Fear of Criminal Prosecution, 25
CAL. BANKR. J. 180, 182 (2000); Allan B. Diamond & Erin E. Jones, Avoiding Litigation
Pitfalls: An Introduction to the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 20, 66 (2008); Leonard M. Shulman &
Kara Germane, A Debtor’s Right to Silence in A Bankruptcy Proceeding, ORANGE COUNTY
LAW., 46, 47 (2005).
289
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incrimination, and retain her right to a discharge.
A debtor may
invoke her right in response to incriminating questions both during
296
As noted earlier, current bankruptcy law
discovery and at trial.
under the Code specifically provides for the preservation of the
privilege; though unlike the previous Act, the grant of immunity is
297
not automatic.
2. Practical Considerations
298

The statistical probability of an offer of immunity is small. It is
unlikely that a request for immunity by the trustee or the United
States Attorney will be made, and any request may be denied by the
Assistant U.S. Attorney General or the district court. Often there is a
sense that a successful objection to discharge can be accomplished
without the testimonial information that a grant of immunity would
compel. Likewise, a United States Attorney may prefer to prosecute
with the available evidence rather than suffer the proof burden of
establishing that the state’s case is not comprised of the debtor’s
testimony or any fruits (evidence) derived from that testimony.
V. THE FORM OF REFORM TO PROTECT THE PRIVILEGE
A. Revision of Official Form B201A Notice to Individual Debtors
The pro se debtor and the debtor with counsel need notice of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. All debtors
should be advised of the existence of the privilege and should be
given some sense of its scope and its limitations. Pre-filing disclosures
relevant to invocation and waiver and the potential consequences of
each would serve the purposes of the rules of bankruptcy procedure
299
and promote the ends of justice. Some may seize on this proposal
as a Miranda warning for the debtor and argue it exceeds the
mandate of Miranda because the proceedings are not custodial or

295

In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Girdaukas, 92 B.R.
373, 376 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988); In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 426 & 430 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1986); Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Salzman (In re Salzman), 61 B.R. 878, 889
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Turner v. Wlodarski (In re Minton Group, Inc.), 43 B.R. 705,
709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
296
Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993).
297
11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006).
298
This assertion is based on the Author’s observations as a deputy prosecuting
attorney, bankruptcy trustee, judge, and practitioner for over 36 years and
conversations with trustees and government attorneys.
299
See generally, FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
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criminal.
Aside from the fact that the proceedings may be
300
custodial, the Author’s thesis is not that Miranda should apply even
in a noncustodial setting. The Author’s thesis is that the privilege
exists as a constitutional right in bankruptcy, and that it has value and
utility to debtors. Therefore, as a matter of adjudicative policy, the
Court should compel disclosure of the right to claim the privilege.
To accomplish this result, a new proposal for an Official Form
should be promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United
States pursuant to its authority under the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (hereinafter “the Rules”) Rule 9009. In the
interim, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts should issue additional forms for use under the Code
301
pursuant to Rule 9009 of the Rules. The proposed form should be
construed to be consistent with the rules and the Code and secure
the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and
302
proceeding.”
1. The Status Quo
Current law mandates that the Official Forms offer several
notices and warnings to the consumer debtor. The first notice
requires disclosure of the opportunities for credit counseling, budget
303
analysis, and instruction on financial management.
The second
notice advises the consumer debtor of the four chapters of the
Bankruptcy Code that may be available as filing options and briefly
304
outlines the nature of each chapter.
In the third numbered
paragraph of the Official Form, the debtor is warned that there are
criminal penalties for the fraudulent concealment of assets, perjury
305
and false swearing, which include fines, imprisonment, or both.
This notice regarding criminal conduct and penalties is
300

See supra Part III.D.4
The current Director is Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Judge Hogan is the chief
administrative officer for the federal courts and secretary to the Judicial Conference
of the United States. For information on the Administrative Office of the United
States
Courts.
See
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
Bankruptcy
Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Bankrupt
cyCourts.aspx.
302
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
303
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A,
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.
304
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A,
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.
305
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A,
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.
301
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immediately followed by the disclosure that “[a]ll information
supplied by a debtor . . . is subject to examination by. . .the
306
Department of Justice.” Finally, in a section labeled “WARNING,”
Official Form B201A concludes by disclosing that Section 521(a)(1)
of the Code requires the debtor to promptly file detailed information
regarding creditors, assets, liabilities, income, expenses, and her
general financial condition. This paragraph warns the debtor that
her bankruptcy case may be dismissed if this information is not filed
with the court within the time deadlines set by the Code, Rules, and
local rules. The debtor is directed to a website address for Official
Form B200 which provides a listing of the documents and
307
deadlines.
The debtor’s attorney must certify delivery of the required
notices and the debtor must affirm that she has received and read the
308
notices. The requirement of these and other notices to the debtor
by Congress and the Court make clear the importance current law
places on the disclosure to the debtor of the opportunities to avoid
bankruptcy, potential bankruptcy filing options, the possibilities for
criminal exposure, criminal penalties, the availability of documents
for inspection by the DOJ, the requirements for disclosure, and risk
309
of dismissal. It seems illogical, given the present breadth and depth
in the level of specificity of notices to the debtor, that the Code, Rules
and Official Forms are strangely silent regarding the debtor’s
privilege against self-incrimination. This is particularly true in light
of the evidentiary value of the privilege and its relative importance
when compared to the notices pertaining to statutory rights and
criminal penalties.
2. A Modest Proposal for Change
As a policy matter, the notion that each of these mandated
notices and warnings are more critical to the consumer debtor than
the disclosure of the privilege is untenable. Although disclosure of
the existence of the privilege is not required under current law, there
is no prohibition of notice. When consideration is given to the
306

11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A,
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.
307
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A,
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.
308
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009; see Official Form B201B,
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.
309
11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009; see also Official Form B201A,
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.
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constitutional origins and evidentiary value of the privilege,
particularly to the pro se debtor, the absence of notice is alarming
310
Although traditionally in bankruptcy
and difficult to understand.
pro se litigants are assumed to be less educated than debtors who are
represented, the opposite is true. The pro se debtor is also more
311
educated than the general pro se population.
The higher level of
education, coupled with the publication and availability of the official
forms, engenders hubris in the consumer debtor. The resulting
overconfidence, when combined with the easy availability of the
forms, tempts the pro se debtor to file a complex federal proceeding
312
that is beyond the debtor’s expertise. As a consequence, the pro se
debtor often discovers belatedly that the filing was ill advised and will
be dismissed or have unintended results. The proof of this
phenomenon can be seen in the relative success rates between pro se
313
and represented filers in obtaining a discharge. Pro se filers are ten
314
times less likely to obtain a discharge.
A procedure for disclosure of the right to the privilege currently

310

Studies show the demographics for pro se debtors in state courts include a
higher incidence among the young, the poor, the less educated, women and
minorities. Ayn Crawley, Trends in Pro Se Litigation, MD. LEGAL ASSISTANCE NETWORK,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/HelpThemselves.pdf (last visited
Aug. 16, 2013) (reporting that statewide statistics of over 40,000 self-represented
users of programs in Maryland in 2002 indicated that 60% were women; 44%
described themselves as African American and 9% as Hispanic; the vast majority had
modest incomes); see also Connie J.A. Beck et al., Divorce Mediation With and Without
Legal Representation: A Focus on Intimate Partner Violence and Abuse, FAMILY COURT REV.,
48(4): 631–645, Oct 2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.17441617.2010.01338.x/pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); see also Chanley S. Painter,
Exploring the Problem of Self-Represented Litigants in Arkansas Civil Courts, Arkansas Access
to Justice Commission in partnership with the Clinton School of Public Service
(2011)
http://www.arkansasjustice.org/sites/default/files/file%20attachments
/Capstone%20Report%20-%20AAJC%20Final.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
311
ANGELA LITTWIN, BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 157–58
(Katherine Porter ed., 2012). Results based on the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy
Project; see Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other Debtor
Relief, LITIGATION NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation
/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html
(offering
explanations of the differences in education level between pro se debtors and other
pro se litigants).
312
Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other Debtor Relief,
LITIGATION NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation
/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html
(offering
explanations of the differences in education level between pro se debtors and other
pro se litigants).
313
Id.
314
Id.
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exists, albeit in the context of another federal civil proceeding. For
more than two decades, the federal administrative rules have been
used to mandate that notice of the privilege be given by the
Department of Justice to respondents in proceedings to assess civil
penalties for possession of small amounts of certain controlled
316
substances. Thus, there is a precedent, a form, and a format in use
by federal authorities in civil proceedings that provide a template for
317
the construction of a similar notice in the bankruptcy context. The
adoption of the wording presently in use could easily be adapted to
provide a new category for the proposed revision of Official Form
B201A to read as follows:
4. Notice to the individual consumer debtor of the right to
invoke privileges, including the privilege against selfincrimination: Any statement given during the course of
any proceedings or any documents filed in the proceedings
may be used against the person in this or any other
proceeding, including any criminal prosecution. Each
individual debtor may be able to assert a privilege, such as
the privilege against self-incrimination.
Any petition,
schedule, statement, or pleading required to be filed or
contested by the debtor in a responsive pleading shall
include a statement that the respondent admits, denies,
does not have and is unable to obtain sufficient information
to admit or deny each allegation, or that an answer to the
allegation is protected by a privilege, including the privilege
against self-incrimination. A statement of lack of information
or a statement that the answer to the allegation is privileged
shall have the effect of a denial.
This simple proposal for an addition to a revised Official Form
B201A will go far in eliminating the dangers that presently lurk for
the uninformed debtor. Whether the individual is an uneducated
pro se debtor or a represented debtor whose attorney has neglected
to inform her of her rights, the harm is the same. No debtor should
be denied her Fifth Amendment right to the privilege against self315

21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 76.4 (b)(2) (2007) (stating that the
Notice of Intent to Assess a Civil Penalty will advise the respondent that any
statement given may be used against the person in any proceeding, including
criminal prosecution and that the respondent may be able to assert a privilege such
as the privilege against self-incrimination).
316
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006).
317
Id.; 28 C.F.R. 76.9(c)(2)–(3) (2007) (providing that the content of any answer
filed by a respondent may contain a statement that an answer to the allegation is
protected by a privilege, including the privilege against self-incrimination, and that
such a statement shall have the effect of a denial).
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incrimination due to personal ignorance or professional neglect.
The Court, under its inherent authority and pursuant to federal
318
law, should adopt a revised Official Form B201A to provide notice
of the debtor’s privilege against self-incrimination as numbered
paragraph 4 of the current form. The form should be promulgated
by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to its
319
authority under Rule 9009 of the Rules.
The revised form would
help to insure that the debtor is aware of the privilege prior to filing.
In the interim, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
320
Courts should issue the revised form for use under the Code. The
Court’s action is necessary to afford the debtor, who appears before
the DOJ trustee in bankruptcy, the same notice that is currently
provided to a civil litigant who is targeted by the DOJ for an
assessment of civil penalties for possession of certain controlled
321
substances.
B. The Rulemaking Process
Proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy are
322
handled by a time-proven and statutorily sanctioned process.
The
process is the same for proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of
323
Evidence. There are seven steps in the process of amending the
bankruptcy forms. The first step in the process is the initial
324
The publication and
consideration by the Advisory Committee.
public comment period is next, followed by consideration of the
public comments and final approval by the Advisory Committee. The
fourth step is the approval by the Standing Committee, followed by
Judicial Conference Approval. Next, the United States Supreme
318
319
320
321

28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 342 (2006); In re Litton, 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.

1987).
322

Rules Enabling Act 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006), available at,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking
/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-public.aspx.
323
UNITED STATES COURTS, Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking
/how-rulemaking-process-works.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
324
UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies
/rules/Members_List_Oct_2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (listing the
composition of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules and contact
information).
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Court must give its approval, and finally there must be Congressional
325
Review and the implementation of the rules.
As of the date of this publication, there are no completed rules
or pending rules that address the issues surrounding the provision of
notice to individual debtors of their Fifth Amendment privilege
326
against self-incrimination. All of those involved in the rulemaking
process have a tremendous responsibility. Debtors and lawyers, no
less than other citizens, are beneficiaries of the Court’s efforts to
preserve and protect the rights of all parties in our system of justice.
That effort includes the preservation and protection of the rights of
debtors and the institutionalization of principles of fundamental
fairness in the bankruptcy courts.

VI. CONCLUSION
The adverse consequences for even one truly innocent debtor,
however seemingly guilty, are disproportionately harsh.
The
protection of the privilege for the factually guilty is equally important
and its loss, equally harsh. This is particularly true when the
protection of every debtor from the inadvertent loss of the privilege
can be so easily accomplished. The current system perpetuates
nondisclosure and allows the unrepresented, uneducated debtor to
be victimized by her own ignorance or the inadvertence of counsel.
In both instances, the integrity and respectability of our system of
justice are needlessly impugned.
The cost of adding a disclosure to the debtor regarding her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination means revising a
mass produced form to include a fourth paragraph on the lower half
of the second page in an otherwise blank space. This would be a
minimally burdensome measure that would go far in preserving one
of our most fundamental constitutional rights. The preservation of
325

One may argue that any change in Official Form B201A must be preceded by a
statutory amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 342(b) because that provision is the statutory
authority for the publication of the notices contained in B201A. The Author
concedes that the argument is not without merit, and that statutory amendment is
desirable; however, the disclosure of the privilege included in the DOJ notice was
authorized by administrative rule without the necessity of Congressional action. The
counterargument is that because the privilege originates in the Constitution, no
statutory authority is needed for the Court to make that fact known as a matter of
adjudicatory policy through its rulemaking authority.
326
Pending
Rules
Amendments,
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesandpolicies/rules/pending-rules.aspx (last visited
Aug. 16, 2013).
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that right and its value to an innocent debtor, however seemingly
guilty, is immeasurable. The value to the factually guilty is critical as
well.
Only when the innocent debtor who is seemingly guilty receives
notice of her constitutional right to the evidentiary privilege against
self-incrimination will the rules in bankruptcy proceedings, “secure
the just . . . determination of every case and proceeding.” Only then
will the privilege take its rightful place alongside bankruptcy’s
mandated notices regarding the availability of credit counseling
services, bankruptcy chapter filing options, bankruptcy crimes, and
the availability of bankruptcy papers to law enforcement officials.
Until that time pro se debtors and debtors with counsel will remain
vulnerable to the loss of the privilege in criminal proceedings
because of nondisclosure.
The existing form highlights the
opportunity for law enforcement review, investigation, and
327
prosecution of all documents and related matters. Without notice,
debtors will face the loss of a privilege scrupulously preserved and
guarded throughout our history in the protection of the
constitutional rights of even the worst criminals.
The debtor, who may be among our poorest citizens, should not
discover in the course of her bankruptcy that she has unwittingly
328
forfeited one of her fundamental constitutional rights.
To avoid
this result, Official Form B201A should be revised in a simple,
straightforward way by providing notice of the privilege to all
individual debtors prior to the time of filing.
A revision of Official Form B201A to include notice of the
privilege will benefit the attorneys who represent debtors as well.
History reveals how fluid the privilege and the law surrounding it can
329
be. The privilege, like the law itself, is a moving stream with waters
that rise and recede and sometimes overflow the banks to course
where they will. Skilled counsel, like experienced boatmen, do well
to observe the weather before braving the currents with those
entrusted to their care.
327

11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009; Official Form B201A,
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.
328
Total consumer (nonbusiness) filings for the 12-month period ending March
31, 2012, were 1,320,613, comprising 97% of all bankruptcy filings. See Table F-2,
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/0312_f2.pdf (last visited
Oct. 7, 2013).
329
See supra Part I.E.
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APPENDIX A
Trustee: Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth?
Sophie: I do.
Trustee: Please state your name and address for the record.
Sophie: My name is Sophie Debtor and I’m from Hard Luck
Town.
Trustee: Did you read your voluntary petition and schedules?
Sophie: Yes.
Trustee: Does it include all your property?
Sophie: Yes.
Trustee: Have you listed all of your debts?
Sophie: No. I recently discovered a credit card bill.
Trustee: What’s the bill for?
Sophie: Cash advances and jewelry.
Trustee: When were these transactions?
Sophie: Within the past 60 days.
Trustee: How much were they?
Sophie: The advance was $1000 and the jewelry was also $1000.
Trustee: Do you have the cash or the jewelry?
Sophie: No.
Trustee: What did you do with these items?
Sophie: My husband gave them to someone without my
permission.
Trustee: Who was it?
Sophie: Corrie Delecti.
Trustee: Where are they now?
Sophie:(Fidgeting and awkward silence).
Corrie Delecti’s
apartment in Hard Luck Town.
Trustee: Is that the woman who was recently murdered?
330
Sophie: Yes.
Trustee: How do you know the cash advances and jewelry are
there?
Sophie: My estranged husband told me.
330

At this point, a judge might have objected on behalf of the debtor and advised
her that she had the right to remain silent. Unfortunately for Sophie, trustees have
wider latitude of questioning in a creditor’s meeting because the court cannot be
present. 11 U.S.C. § 341(c) (2006).
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Trustee: So, have you been to the apartment and seen the items?
Sophie: Well, I’ve been to the apartment complex, but I did not
go into her apartment.
Trustee: When was this?
Sophie: The night that she was killed.
Trustee: So you were in the apartment complex of your
husband’s mistress on the night that she was murdered, but you
didn’t go into her apartment? Not even to ask her to give back
the jewelry that he had supposedly given to her?
Sophie: No. I was there to see another friend. I did see Ms.
Delecti and speak to her, but I did not inquire about the items
because I did not know the woman with whom I spoke was Ms.
Delecti at that time. I only realized after I saw the news reports
of her murder. Ms. Delecti was my friend’s neighbor.
Trustee: Can this friend verify that you did not go in to Corrie
Delecti’s apartment?
Sophie: Well, no. My friend wasn’t home that night. I just
dropped by and she did not know that I was coming over.
Trustee: So you are asking me to believe that the cash and
jewelry were purchased without your knowledge or permission,
given to the murdered mistress of your husband, and that you
went to her apartment the night of her murder and neither went
into her apartment nor asked her about these items. Is that
right?
Sophie: Yes. That’s the truth. I swear.
Trustee: Have you amended your schedule to reflect these
transactions?
Sophie: No.
Trustee: Will you do so?
Sophie: Yes.
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APPENDIX B
Trustee: Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth?
Sophie: I do.
Trustee: Please state your name for the record.
Sophie: My name is Sophie Debtor and I’m from Hard Luck
Town.
Trustee: Did you read your voluntary petition and schedules?
Sophie: Yes.
Trustee: Does it include all your property?
Sophie: Yes.
Trustee: Have you listed all of your debts?
Sophie/Counsel: I (my client) respectfully wish(es) to
unambiguously invoke my (her) right to the privilege against
self-incrimination on the grounds that my (her) response may
incriminate me (her).

